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Market participants, academicians, and governmental officials debated
how the United States government should structure multiple securities ex-
changes for several years before Congress mandated the establishment of
the National Market System in the 1975 Amendments to the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. During the intervening twenty-five years, recurring is-
sues concerning the transparency, fragmentation, and fairness of the
National Market System have remained unresolved. Recently, the global-
ization of securities markets and the development of Internet technology
that permits cost-effective transnational securities trades and markets have
exacerbated these issues. In fact, Internet technology makes the develop-
ment of an integrated global securities market not only feasible, but opti-
mal.
This essay reviews the SEC's approach to the National Market System
with an emphasis on developments since the advent of the Cyber-age. The
review shows that, despite technological developments that have propelled
markets towards globalization, the SEC has taken a distinctly territorial
approach in creating a safe harbor from registration for foreign stock ex-
* Of Counsel, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. The author would like to thank the fol-
lowing individuals for their comments on earlier drafts of this essay: Howell Jackson, Wil-
liam Mako, John Ruckrich, Jan Slinn, John Chapman, Dave Milli, Seth Amera, and Oleg
Kiorsak. Herbert F. Brooks, Jr. and Elizabeth King of the Division of Market Regulation,
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission provided the author with an understanding of the
existing regulation of securities trading over the Internet. Special thanks go to Jeanne Om-
merle for manuscript preparation and to Naomi Frances Heep for graphic design.
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changes that utilize the Internet. At present, the SEC is considering the
conditions under which such a foreign exchange must register. This essay
argues that the SEC should focus more on the systems architecture offor-
eign securities exchanges and less on its present territorial approach.
While maintaining the National Market System and the existing safe harbor,
this essay argues that market participants should apply for, and the SEC
should consider, granting registration to an Internet-based securities mar-
ket. The SEC should not base this grant of registration upon the geo-
graphic locus of the exchange, or of its members or issuers. Rather, the
SEC should grant the registration upon a showing that the exchange's sys-
tems architecture furthers the objectives of the federal securities laws.
The proposed integrated global securities market ("IGSM") would
serve as a SRO/exchange that would accept listings from an issuer as long
as the issuer meets the disclosure requirements of its home jurisdiction. An
issuer listed on the IGSM could not be traded on another exchange, unless
that exchange participated in the price/time priority order book of the
IGSM. This condition would resolve many of the difficulties that have
plagued the National Market System. The IGSM proposal takes account of
considerations of regulatory competition because: (1) the price of an is-
suer's shares traded on the IGSM would reflect the issuer's home country
standard of disclosure; (2) the IGSM would compete for listings against
other exchanges with higher or lower mandatory levels of disclosure, in-
cluding those in the National Market System; and (3) the IGSM prevents the
listing of an issuer from a strict regulatory regime being traded on an ex-
change from a lax regulatory regime, i.e., regulatory free-riding.
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 14, 2000, the EASDAQ1 announced that it would begin
trading the ten largest NASDAQ-listed issuers within one week, "a move
that does not require the consent of the companies involved."2  The
"NASDAQ Ten" 3 represent a combined market capitalization of US$2.34
1 "EASDAQ" stands for the European Association of Securities Dealers Automated
Quotation System. The EASDAQ, established in 1996, is a self-styled "independent pan-
European stock market [offering] international growth companies and investors seamless
cross-border trading, clearing and settlement within a unified market infrastructure." The
Pan-European Exchange, EASDAQ, at http://easdaq.com/easdaq.asp (last visited Sept. 23,
2000).
2 Sylvia Ascarelli, Easdaq to Trade 10 Leading Stocks Listed on the Nasdaq, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 14, 2000, at C6.
3 The "NASDAQ Ten" issuers are comprised of Microsoft Corp., Cisco Systems, Inc.,
Intel Corp., Oracle Corp., Sun Micosystems, Inc., MCI WorldCom, Inc., Dell Computer
Corp., Yahoo! Inc., Amgen Inc., and Amazon.com, Inc. See id.
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trillion.4 This constitutes a substantial portion of domestic market capitali-
zation, and it represents an amount comparable to the total market capitali-
zation of each of the five U.S. regional exchanges: the Boston, Chicago,
Cincinnati, Pacific, and Philadelphia Stock Exchanges. This watershed de-
velopment illustrates several existing difficulties inherent in the National
Market System ("NMS") because transactions in these new "household
name" issuers take place in a foreign jurisdiction and are not necessarily
reported on the NMS. This essay's analysis of the NASDAQ Ten applies to
all traded issues: domestic and foreign, large and small cap, and liquid and
illiquid.
Congress mandated that the Securities and Exchange Commission
(" SEC" or "Commission") facilitate the development of the NMS in the
1975 Amendments5 to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (" the Exchange
Act"). 6 Although observers have long debated issues of market fragmenta-
tion, payment for order flow, and transparency with regard to the NMS,
these issues have become exacerbated by the globalization of securities
markets in a high-technology environment that permits investors and mar-
ket intermediaries to make cross-border transactions quickly and inexpen-
sively. This debate has been grounded in the fact that, as noted above,
public issuers exercise no choice over the securities market in which their
shares are traded.
This essay examines the territorial character of the NMS despite the
existence of technology that has created a global securities market. Part II
provides background for the dilemma faced by the SEC in developing a
regulatory policy for addressing global Internet stock trading by summa-
rizing the legal, market, and technological background of the problem. A
review of the SEC's approach to regulating market structure yields three
conclusions. First, the SEC has maintained a policy of modifying the
regulation of market structure only incrementally since passage of the 1975
Amendments. Second, this approach has retained a bias towards the regu-
lation of a territorial, rather than a global, market structure. Supporting this
conclusion, a recent statement from the Commission7 addresses the offer of
' The market capitalization of an issuer is the product of the number of the issuer's shares
times the market value of a single share. This figure was derived from the sum of the market
capitalizations of the NASDAQ Ten issuers at the market close on March 21, 2000, as re-
ported on http://www.finance.yahoo.com (on file with author). The market capitalizations
(in US$ billions) were: Microsoft Corp. (534.8), Cisco Systems, Inc. (488.6), Intel Corp.
(462.5), Oracle Corp. (227.7), Sun Micosystems, Inc. (173.4), MCI WorldCom, Inc. (124.4),
Dell Computer Corp. (148.8), Yahoo! Inc. (101.0), Amgen Inc. (62.6), and Amazon.com,
Inc. (24.7). See YahoolFinance, at http://finance.yahoo.com.
5 See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975) (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
6 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq [hereinafter Exchange Act].
7 See Statement of the Commission Regarding Use of Internet Web Sites to Offer Securi-
ties Transactions or Advertise Investment Services Offshore, Securities Act Release No. 33-
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services by a stock exchange over the Internet. In this statement, the SEC
relied on the "Targeting Approach." Pursuant to the Targeting Approach,
the Commission will not require a foreign exchange using a Web site to
register as long as it does not target its services to residents of the United
States, and if it takes steps reasonably designed to prevent U.S. residents
from directing orders to the exchange through its Web site. Such steps in-
clude placement of a disclaimer on the Web site stating that U.S. residents
cannot access the exchange's services. Third, Part II reveals that the Com-
mission's incremental approach to the regulation of market structure has not
resolved issues of order fragmentation, payment for order flow, and trans-
parency presented by the NMS. The Commission's May 27, 1997 state-
ment on the regulation of exchanges' indicates that the Commission favors
an approach that will not only keep open the issues which have beset the
NMS, but will extend the NMS to global securities market linkages.
Although the Commission's regulation and adjustment of market
structure has remained a slow and incremental process over the last twenty-
five years, Part II summarizes how relevant changes in global securities
markets have been rapid and revolutionary. Cross-border listings and trans-
actions in securities are increasing at an extraordinary rate. Physical stock
exchanges are consolidating domestically and abroad, while electronic
trading systems are proliferating. It is not surprising that technology, par-
ticularly the Internet, drives many of these changes. We have long known
that due to technological advances, "markets no longer are, or need to be,
physical places." 9 The territorial focus of the SEC's Targeting Approach,
however, runs counter to the borderless global securities market created by
the Internet.
Part II further reveals that, contrary to popular belief, the Internet is
readily subject to regulation for the purpose of creating efficient securities
markets. A summary of Internet architecture indicates that although it is a
medium not prone to regulation with respect to geopolitical borders, a
regulator can control access to information, interaction among participants,
and surveillance of financial transactions within a partially "closed" sys-
tems architecture-the same activities that securities regulators presently
exercise over exchanges.
Part III of this essay critiques the current policy approach towards
transnational trading of securities over the Internet. Part Il analyzes the
7516, Exchange Act Release No. 34-39779, 66 SEC Docket 1869 (Mar. 23, 1998) [herein-
after Internet Release].
8 See Regulation of Exchanges, Exchange Act Release No. 34-38672, 64 SEC Docket
1631 (May 23, 1997) [hereinafter Regulation of Exchanges Release].
9 U.S. Equity Market Structure Study, Exchange Act Release No. 34-30920, 51 SEC
Docket 1524, 1541 (July 14, 1992) (reprinting letter from Richard Breeden, Chairperson of
the SEC, to Edward Markey, Chairperson, Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Fi-
nance (July 11, 1991) [hereinafter Market Structure Study Release].
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Targeting Approach in light of the findings in Part II about globalized secu-
rities markets and technological developments. This analysis is timely be-
cause the International Organization of Securities Commissions
("IOSCO") ° adopted the Targeting Approach, as have several regulators of
developed securities markets. The implication for global securities markets
of the Targeting Approach is a dangerous territoriality: if every national se-
curities regulator applied this approach to stock exchanges that offer trading
capacity over the Internet, the result would be regulatory uncertainty for
domestic and foreign exchanges, fragmentation of the global securities
market, and the limitation of Internet-based stock exchange services to each
exchange's home jurisdiction.
As the Targeting Approach presents a narrow safe harbor of territorial
character, Part IV proposes a solution to the problem of fragmented global
markets via the Internet by recommending that the Commission consider
systems architecture in the regulation of exchanges. One approach would
be for market participants to propose, and for the Commission to consider,
the high regulatory objective of registering an exchange of transnational
membership, disclosure and listings that utilizes systems architecture to
protect investors and promote efficiency. For the purposes of this essay,
such a proposed exchange is termed an "Integrated Global Securities Mar-
ket" ("IGSM"). Part IV proposes that the IGSM would be an exchange, de-
pository, and self-regulatory organization that is on an automated order-
match systems platform with remote access for intermediaries and inves-
tors. Under this proposal, the IGSM applicant would seek approval for
"home country" levels of disclosure for issuers, but maintain the high stan-
dards of transparency, execution, recordkeeping, membership, and surveil-
lance that are equal to or better than those found within the NMS.
Arbitration agreements would be binding on issuers, participants and in-
vestors in order to reduce difficulties arising out of foreign court processes.
Issuers, participants, and investors could be located in any country and trade
securities on the IGSM over the Internet or other suitable communications
media as long as they adhere to the federal securities laws and the rules of
the IGSM. The members of the IGSM and the location of the IGSM's
computerized trading system could also be located in any country as long as
the SEC, directly or indirectly through a Memorandum of Understanding,
had clear regulatory capacity over the IGSM and all its operations.
10 Securities regulators and exchanges from 158 countries constitute IOSCO. The objec-
tives of IOSCO are the cooperation among regulators to set high standards of securities
regulation and the exchange of information among members. Most of IOSCO's work is car-
ried out by the following special committees: Disclosure and Accounting, Secondary Mar-
kets, Intermediaries, Enforcement, and Investment Management. IOSCO also has several
executive and regional committees. The General Secretariat of IOSCO is staffed by six peo-
ple. See generally IOSCO, 1998 ANNuAL REPORT, available at http://www.iosco.or
g/annual report (last visited Mar. 22, 2000).
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Part IV argues that an IGSM presents an efficient alternative to ex-
tending the NMS's regulatory obligations to foreign exchanges through the
Targeting Approach. An IGSM creates an environment for regulatory
competition by various jurisdictions having differing disclosure require-
ments and by preventing regulatory "free riding." Moreover, the concept of
an IGSM correlates to the efficiencies produced by the low-cost, transna-
tional medium of the Internet. Finally, because an IGSM consolidates order
execution in a price/time priority book, the proposal resolves several of the
issues regarding the NMS that are surveyed in Part II. There are several
possible objections to the IGSM proposal, which Part IV addresses.
The essay concludes by directing its recommendations to market par-
ticipants and issuers to make a concrete IGSM proposal to the SEC.
II. BACKGROUND: THE SEC'S TERRITORIAL APPROACH TO
REGULATING MARKET STRUCTURE IN A GLOBAL
MARKETPLACE
The SEC's approach to modifying the NMS to meet market and tech-
nological conditions has been slow and incremental. In contrast, advances
in market globalization and technology have been dramatic. Indeed, tech-
nology has driven the evolution of market structure before and after the
creation of the NMS. 11 The advent of the ticker tape spawned the notorious
bucket shops, 12 and expensive long-distance telephone tolls supported the
development of regional exchanges. 13 This section argues that the devel-
opment of widespread Internet use for order flow and the proliferation of
alternative trading systems ("ATSs") have created a paradigm for efficient
global securities market structure that the territorial nature of domestic se-
curities regulation ignores.
'1 See generally Donald Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Secu-
rities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1985); Lewis D. Solomon & Louise Corso, The
Impact of Technology on the Trading of Securities: The Emerging Global Market and The
Implications for Regulation, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 299 (1991) (arguing for prompt regu-
latory action in light of advances in technology at the time); Corinne Bronfman, Kenneth
Lehn & Robert A. Schwartz, The SEC's Market 2000 Report, 19 J. CORP. L. 523, 524
(1994).
" See Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1484-85
(1997). A "bucket shop" was an unregistered broker-dealer that accepted market orders from
customers for transactions in securities, but did not execute them at the prevailing market
price. See BARRON'S DIcIoNARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 68 (John Downes &
Jordan Elliot Goodman eds. 1998).
13 See Dale A. Oesterle, Comments on the SEC's Market 2000 Report: On, Among Other
Things, Deference to SROs, the Mirage of Price Improvement, the Arrogation of Property
Rights in Order Flow, and SEC Incrementalism, 19 J. Cop'. L. 483, 506 (1994).
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A. Legal Background: An Incremental Approach to Extending the National
Market System
This section provides summary background of the 1975 Amendments
and the SEC staff's first major assessment of the NMS, the Market 2000
Report. Then, focusing on more recent regulatory activity, this section de-
scribes the Commission's releases on the regulation of exchanges, the
Internet, and ATSs. This survey indicates that Professor Langevoort's ob-
servation of fifteen years ago holds true today:
In 1975 [Congress] directed the SEC to oversee the implementation of a 'na-
tional market system' that would enlist information technology as a means to
move to a more efficient and competitive marketplace. To date, however, the
regulatory efforts in that direction have remained less than revolutionary.
Rather than remake the market system, the SEC has concentrated on reforms
within the existing structure, particularly with regard to communications and
order-routing among competing exchanges.14
The legal background of the NMS sets the stage for the Commission's pres-
ent dilemma in the Cyber-age. The Commission has adhered to the same
regulatory scheme for twenty-five years during which global markets and
technology have evolved radically.
1. The 1975 Amendments and Creation of the National Market System
The 1975 Amendments to the Exchange Act created the NMS. 15 Con-
gress intended the 1975 Amendments to prevent several negative conse-
quences resulting from inefficiencies in the domestic securities market at
the time.16 These inefficiencies arose because securities exchanges had be-
come increasingly interdependent due to technological innovations but
lacked the flexibility to meet the challenges of changed economic condi-
tions since passage of the Exchange Act.1 After five years of study, Con-
gress found that the lack of coordination between markets caused
misallocation of capital, widespread inefficiency, and potentially harmful
trading fragmentation.' s
In the 1975 Amendments, Congress specifically endorsed the devel-
opment of the NMS, and set forth its objectives as: (i) economically effi-
cient executions of securities transactions; (ii) fair competition among
brokers and dealers, among exchange markets, and between exchange mar-
kets and markets other than exchange markets; (iii) public availability of
14 Langevoort, supra note 11, at 754-55.
15 See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975) (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
16 The concept of a national market system was initiated by the findings of the Commis-
sion's 1971 Institutional Investor Study. See generally SEC, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR
STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92nd Cong. (1' Sess. 1971).
'7 See H.R. REP. No. 94-123, at 44 (1975).
' See S. REP. No. 94-75, at 1 (1975).
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quotation and transaction information; (iv) investor access to the best mar-
kets; and (v) an opportunity, consistent with clauses (i) and (iv), for the or-
ders of investors to be executed without the intermediation of a dealer.19
Due to the uncertainty over how technological and economic changes
would affect the securities markets over time, Congress explicitly rejected
an approach that mandated specific components of the NMS. In contrast,
the 1975 Amendments granted the Commission flexible powers to ensure
"that the securities markets and the regulations of the securities industry
remain strong and capable of fostering [the] fundamental goals [of the Ex-
change Act] under changing economic and technological conditions.,
20
Certainly, technological innovations played a substantial role in the 1975
Amendments. The hallmark of the 1975 Amendments, new Exchange Act
Section 1lA, directed the Commission to implement the NMS in accor-
dance with Congressional findings that "[n]ew data processing and commu-
nications techniques create the opportunity for more efficient and effective
market operations" and that "[t]he linking of all markets for qualified secu-
rities through communication and data processing facilities will foster effi-
ciency, enhance competition, ,and] increase the information available to
brokers, dealers, and investors" 1
After passage of the 1975 Amendments, the Commission made funda-
mental market structure changes in the U.S motivated by "the most impor-
tant objective of the [NMS], to foster the development of strong
competition among its members." 2 2 The NMS led to three major changes
in the regulatory structure of U.S. trading markets: abolition of fixed com-
missions, elimination of anti-competitive trading restrictions on exchange
members, and creation of information linkages between markets constitut-
ing the NMS. The most prominent of these changes was the abolition of the
NYSE Rules that, from 1792 until May 1, 1975, fixed commission rates and
prohibited members from discounting commissions.2 3
For the purposes of this essay, the second change is more relevant than
the abolition of fixed commission rates. This change eradicated exchange
rules that restricted off-exchange trading by members.24 Significantly, the
Commission sought to eliminate boundaries between the market centers and
19 See Exchange Act § 1 IA(a)(1)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(1)(C) (2000).
20 S. REP. No. 94-75, supra note 18, at 3.
21 Langevoort, supra note 11, at n.27.
2 SEC, Policy Statement on the Structure of a Central Market System 8 (Mar. 29, 1973);
see also Joel Seligman, The Future of the National Market System, 10 J. CORP. L. 79, 117-18
(1984).
2 See generally Gregg A. Jarrell, Change at the Exchange: The Causes and Effects of
Deregulation, 27 J.L. & ECON. 273, 276 (1984).
24 See generally Laura N. Beny, A Survey of Current Regulatory and Structural Issues
US. Secondary Markets and a Reform Proposal (Harvard Law School Working Paper), at
http://www.cyber.law.harvard.edu/rfi/papers/index.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2000) [herein-
after Survey].
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to create a unified structure of competing market centers.25 In so doing, the
SEC targeted for elimination "any and all rules of national securities ex-
changes which limit or condition the ability of members to effect transac-
tions in securities otherwise than on such exchanges.",26
The NMS's third and most relevant change to pre-1975 market struc-
ture was the establishment of a highly complicated network of information
technology systems that connected different market centers throughout the
country. These systems include the Consolidated Tape, the Consolidated
Quotation System (" CQS"), and the Intermarket Trading System
(" ITS" ).27 The Consolidated Tape reports securities transactions within 90
seconds of completion for most securities listed on an exchange, regardless
of whether the trades occur on an exchange or on the OTC market.28 The
Automated Confirmation Transaction Reporting Service ("ACT"), a
NASDAQ-operated reporting system, supplements the Consolidated Tape,
which disseminates last sales information in real time for most non-
exchange-listed securities (i.e., NASDAQ securities).29
In contrast to the transaction reporting that takes place on the Consoli-
dated Tape and the ACT, the CQS publicly distributes pre-transaction quo-
tation information; that is to say, it disseminates highest bid and lowest
offer prices ("NBBO") for almost all exchange-listed securities based on
the quotations furnished by exchanges and OTC dealers. 30 Exchanges must
submit the price quotations and trade sizes at which their members have in-
dicated a willingness to trade.31  Similarly, the NASD must provide the
NBBO prices and quotation sizes at which member broker-dealers are
willing to trade.32 In addition to the CQS, the NASDAQ Quotation Dis-
semination Service ("NQDS") reports the NBBO information for
25 According to Professors Davis and Lightfoot, in creating the design of the NMS, "the
efforts of individual marketplaces to achieve consolidation at the expense of other market-
places were to be displaced by a much grander effort that would no longer recognize mar-
ketplace boundaries'." Jeffrey L. Davis & Lois E. Lightfoot, Fragmentation Versus
Consolidation of Securities Trading: Evidence from the Operation of Rule 19c-3, 41 J. L. &
ECON. 209,211 (1998).26 d.
2 7 See generally Allen Ferrell, The Problem of Small Investors and Inefficient Market
Competition: A Deregulatory Proposal 39-42 (Harvard Law School Working Paper) (pre-
sented to Seminar on Corporate Law Policy, Harvard Law School, November 23, 1999); see
also Morris Mendelson & Julius Peake, Intermediaries' or Investors': Whose Market is it
Anyway?, 19 J. CoRp. L. 443, 463 (1994).
28 See Ferrell, supra note 27, at 39.
29 See Nasdaq Stock Market, NASD Manual (CCH) 4630-42, at 5,871-5,904 (Dec.
2000).3 0 See Ferrell, supra note 27, at 39 (citing MARKEr 2000 REPORT, infra note 42, at Ap-
pendix III, p.3).
31 See id. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.1 lAcl-l(b)(1)(i)).
32 See id. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.1 lAcl-l(b)(1)(ii) and noting the existence of exceptions
to this requirement).
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NASDAQ National Market System and Small Cap securities, and securities
dealers must fill their bids and asks at the prices they post on the NQDS.
33
The ITS enables members of one market center to route their orders to
another market center for execution by linking OTC dealers and the ex-
changes through a linkage from the ITS to the NASDAQ linkage, the
NASD's Computer Assisted Execution System CCAES").3 4 The CAES
also allows OTC dealers to transfer orders for exchange-listed securities
among themselves for execution through the ITS/CAES linkage.35
Unfortunately, this complicated series of systems linkages has failed to
ensure that orders for securities are always executed at the NBBO,36 and
"[a]lmost everyone agrees that the ITS is flawed, but for different rea-
sons."37 As a result of these flaws, securities markets have not competed
for order flow by revealing the highest bid or lowest offer for a security that
is possible. This proposition finds support in statistical evidence comparin
the spreads of listed securities before and after implementation of the ITS3
and a comparison of spreads for ITS versus non-ITS stocks.39 The reasons
for the phenomenon of exchanges not competing though exposure of the
best NBBO are generally cited as the ability of markets to cross orders in-
side the NBBO spread, the reluctance of dealers or specialists to risk post-
ing quotes on the CQS or NQDS when the market might move against their
quotes, and a basic inability of the NMS linkages to capture all trading in-
terests instantaneously, thereby making the future of those systems quite
uncertain.
40
In summary, the NMS reporting systems are far from seamless. The
various reporting linkages attempt to operate across different types of mar-
kets (order-driven vs. broker-driven), to disseminate information on prod-
ucts subject to different listing requirements, and to capture bid/ask as well
33 See id. at 39-40 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.1lAcl-l(c)(1), (2), (10) and MARKET 2000
REPORT, infra note 42, at Appendix III, p.2 n.10).
34 See id. at 40.
35 See Adoption of Amendments to ITS System Plan to Expand the ITS/CAES Computer
Assisted Linkage to all Listed Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 34-42212, 71 SEC
Docket 547 (Feb. 14,2000).
36 See Ferrell, supra note 27, at 41-42.
37 Greg Ip, NYSE, in Break With Heavyweights, Calls For End to System Linking Mar-
kets, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2000, at Cl.
38 See Ferrell, supra note 27, at 42 (citing SEC, Directorate of Economic Policy and
Analysis, A Monitoring Report on the Operation of the ITS System: 1978-1981, 40 (June
1982)).39 See id. at 42 (citing Marshall Blume & Michael Goldstein, Quotes, Order Flow and
Price Discovery, 52 J. FIN. 221,235 (1997)).
40 See Ferrel, supra note 27, at 43-44 (collecting sources). Recently, the N.Y.S.E. has
asked to withdraw from the Consolidated Tape and CQS, arguing that technological ad-
vances have provided broker-dealers with the ability to obtain similar information without
those systems. See Greg Ip, NYSE Tells Regulators It Wants to Quit Stock-Data Distribution
Organization, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2000, at C8.
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as transactional data. Such an overview of NMS reporting systems lends
support to the observation that the Consolidated Tape, ITS and CQS are "a
Byzantine set of systems which would have put the late cartoonist Rube
Goldberg's fertile imagination to shame ... [The] 'ITS, which links the
New York with some regional exchanges, is a communications device and
nothing more. It is as far from the concept of an automated, efficient mar-
ketplace as a tom-tom is from a communications satellite."'4 1
2. The Market 2000 Report-January 27, 199442
The Market 2000 Report, announced in 199243 and released in 1994,
set forth the findings of the SEC's Division of Market Regulation (the
"Staff') on the NMS. The Market 2000 Report was the first major assess-
ment of the NMS by the Staff or the Commission since its establishment.
The Staff believed an assessment was warranted because the domestic secu-
rities markets had changed dramatically due to advances in technology,
globalization of markets, and innovation of products, and these develop-
ments had caused market participants to question the efficacy of the NMS."
The Market 2000 Report addressed whether the NMS had fostered the
competition that resulted in efficient pricing, effectively disseminated mar-
ket information, improved execution of orders, and improved customer
service by broker-dealers. 45 Significantly, the Staff found that "today's eq-
uity markets are operating efficiently within the existing regulatory struc-
ture,",46 and that "[r]ecord amounts of trading activity are processed
smoothly and efficiently"; 47 therefore, the Staff did not "believe that a ma-
jor revision in equity market regulation is needed.""
In the Market 2000 Report, the Staff assessed and rejected two propos-
als for revolutionary modification to the NMS: the "single-market ap-
41 Mendelson & Peake, supra note 27, at 447 (quoting Progress Toward the Development
of a National Market System: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and the
Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce, 96 th Cong. 70 (1979)).
4 2 See DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
MARKET 2000: AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EQUITY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS (1994)
[hereinafter MARKET 2000 REPORT]. For a symposium on the MARKET 2000 REPORT, see
SYMPOSIuM: MARKETr2000, 19 J. CORP. L. 437 (1994).
43 See Market Structure Study Release, supra note 9, at 1524.




48 Id. at 2. The Division of Market Regulation reported that minor regulatory revisions
were needed in the areas of: 1) fair treatment to investors, 2) dissemination of market infor-
mation, 3) fair competition among markets and participants, and 4) open access to markets.
See generally id., at studies II-VII.
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proach" and a deregulatory approach.49 The Staff found a preferable ap-
proach to be "discrete, incremental market improvements within the ambit
of its historical regulatory role: protecting investors, facilitating fair market
competition, and promoting full disclosure."50 The Staff pressed on that the
Commission should continue to provide guidance on where improvements
are needed in certain areas. In most instances, responsibility for action
should rest with "the markets themselves.'
To this conclusion, one contemporaneous observer stated that the
Staff's conclusion ran counter to its ongoing regulatory practice:
The Staff's restraint, a hallmark of the Report, seems admirable until it is put
in context. The existing structure of the equity markets in the United States is
excessively complex, and it has been created by, or with the approval of the
SEC. So, the SEC, after having created a cumbersome, overly regulated sys-
tem, with multiple tiers and sub tiers, now says it will let markets work and act
"incrementally."
52
As discussed further infra, other Commentators also assessed the NMS
more disfavorably than did the Staff,5 3 and the unified market approach has
continued to have its adherents.
5 4
3. The Regulation of Exchanges Release-May 23, 1997
On May 23, 1997, the Commission issued a "Concept Release on the
Regulation of Markets in Light of Recent Advances in Technology and
Transnational Development of Securities Markets" ("Regulation of Ex-
changes Release").55 This Release examined the significant challenges to
the existing regulatory framework created by technological advances. The
Regulation of Exchanges Release stated that two primary developments
highlighted the need for a more forward-looking, flexible regulatory
framework. These developments were the exponential growth of ATSs 
6
that presented comparable alternatives to traditional exchanges and the de-
49 See id. at study III 5-7. For a discussion of the single-market approach, see infra Sec-
tion IVA.5 0 Id. at study 111-7.
-" Id. at study 111-15.
52 Oesterle, supra note 13, at 505 (emphasis in original).
53 See, e.g., Mendelson & Peake, supra note 27 (arguing that the NMS currently favors
intermediaries at the expense of investors); Oesterle, supra note 13, at 507 (arguing that the
NMS stifles competition by concentrating too much power in the SRO's); Bronfnan, supra
note 11, at 526 (arguing that the Commission should not be intervening in the current com-
petitive environment with the NMS); see also infra Section II.A.6.
" See infra Section IV.A.
55 See Regulation of Exchanges Release, supra note 8.
56 This matter is dealt with in Sections II-VI of the Regulation of Exchanges Release, su-
pra note 8. The result of the Commissions consideration of these matters is the ATS Release
discussed infra notes 81 to 93 and accompanying text.
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velopment of technology that facilitated access to foreign markets from the
United States.57
Although the lack of ATS participation in the NMS "call[ed] into
question the fairness of current regulatory requirements, the effectiveness of
existing NMS mechanisms, and the quality of public secondary markets,
58
the Regulation of Exchanges Release recognized that the impact of techno-
logical change was not limited to the U.S. markets. The Commission rec-
ognized that the regulatory issues presented by unregulated ATSs were the
same as those presented by foreign markets, information vendors, and bro-
ker-dealers whose automated systems enabled U.S. persons to trade directly
on foreign markets from the United States.59 The Commission stated that
because it had not addressed this issue:
[M]any foreign markets have been reluctant to provide these services directly
to U.S. investors. This has highlighted the need to establish standards that can
accommodate U.S. investors' growing interest in cross-border trading, and
better ensure that this type of cross-border trading is subject to appropriate
safeguards. At the same time, improved foreign market access would mean
that U.S. investors can trade securities of companies listed solely on foreign
markets as easily as securities of companies that satisfy the Commission's dis-
closure and reporting requirements. This would raise additional questions as to
how to craft a regulatory scheme that provides sufficient information to inves-
tors about the securities they trade.60
The Commission began its analysis for proposing a solution to this
problem by dismissing two approaches that lay at the regulatory extremes:
requiring foreign markets to register domestically and relying solely on the
home country regulation of foreign exchanges. 61 The Commission dis-
missed the former approach because domestic regulation was not necessar-
ily designed to accommodate foreign exchanges with only limited
operations in the United States.62 Moreover, domestic regulation could con-
5 See Regulation of Exchanges Release, supra note 8, at 8. The latter issue is addressed
in Section VII of the Release. Although the latter development is the focus of this essay, the
regulation of ATSs in the Release sets the stage for further analysis. At the time of the
Regulation of Exchanges Release, ATSs were not fully integrated into the NMS. See id. at
9. Consequently, the trading activity on ATSs was not necessarily disclosed to, or accessible
by, investors. This trading activity, moreover, was not necessarily under regulatory surveil-
lance for market manipulation and fraud. See id. Finally, the ATSs had no obligation to en-
sure that their trading systems could withstand periods of high volume. See id.
58 Id. at9.
59 See id. at 9-10.
60Id. at 10.
61 The Commission stated that any regulatory approach should address the relative lack of
disclosure about the securities of issuers that do not file reports pursuant to the Exchange
Act, whether U.S. investors would receive sufficient disclosure of the risks of trading on a
foreign market, and the ability of the Commission to enforce the federal securities laws in a
foreign jurisdiction. See id. at 14.
62 See id. at 181.
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flict with the home country market regulation or create unnecessarily dupli-- • 63
cative or expensive regulatory obligations. The Commission dismissed
the latter approach because U.S. persons may incorrectly assume that they
would receive the same level of investor protections that they would receive
when trading on a U.S. market. In contrast, when compared to a U.S. mar-
ket, a foreign market may: provide less information about the risks that ac-
company trading on a foreign market; operate under reduced levels of
market surveillance, transparency and integrity; and provide less opportu-
nity for civil relief 6 4
The Regulation of Exchanges Release requested comment on a third
proposed approach, one that regulates two basic categories of "access pro-
viders to foreign markets. 6 5 The first category consisted of "entities that
distribute or publish information regarding transactions on a foreign market,
and provide a direct electronic link on behalf of the U.S. members of that
foreign market" as "securities information processors" ("SIPs"). 66 The sec-
ond category consisted of foreign and domestic broker-dealers that "provide
U.S. persons who are not members of a foreign market with the technologi-
cal capability to trade directly on a foreign market."67 The Commission
reasoned that because such access is functionally equivalent to the access
provided by SIP access providers, it presents the same risks to U.S. inves-
tors. Consequently, similar requirements for record-keeping, reporting, dis-
closure, and fraud should apply to both SIPs and broker-dealer access
providers.68 Both categories of intermediaries would be subject to NMS
trade reporting requirements.
63 See id.
64 See id. at 175-180.65 1d. at 191-94.
6 Id. at 195-99. Section 3(a)(22)(A) of the Exchange Act provides the definition of a
SIP. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(22)(A) (1994). Section lIA(b) of the Exchange Act requires
SIPs to register with the Commission. See 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(b) (1994). Section 1 1A(b)(1)
exempts non-exclusive SIPs from registration until such time as the Commission finds that
the registration of such non-exclusive SIPs is necessary or appropriate in the public interest,
for the protection of investors, or for the achievement of the purposes of Section 1 A. See
id. The Commission has not yet promulgated any such rules or orders. See Regulation of
Exchanges Release, supra note 8, at n.236. In 1975, the Commission adopted Rule I lAb2-
1, which provides that each SIP that is required to be registered pursuant to Section
1 IA(b)(1) of the Exchange Act (i.e., exclusive SIPs) must file an application for registration
on Form SIP. See Notice of Adoption of Rule I lAb2-1 and Related Form SIP, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-11673,7 SEC Docket 918 (Sept. 23, 1975). Currently, five exclusive
SIPs are registered under Section 1 A: (1) the Consolidated Tape Association; (2) the Con-
solidated Quotation System; (3) the Securities Industry Automation Corporation; (4)
NASDAQ; and 5) the Options Price Reporting Authority. See Regulation of Exchanges Re-
lease, supra note 8, at n.237.
67 Regulation of Exchanges Release, supra note 8, at 183.
6
1 See id. One commentator has observed that the definitions in the Release provide sev-
eral loopholes that could become problematic, such as e-mail and major service providers, as
well as online communications firms that provide data, but not an electronic link to foreign
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The questions posed by the Regulation of Exchanges Release con-
cerning the regulation of domestic access to foreign markets by SIPs, access
providers, broker-dealers, and exchanges remain unresolved because the
Commission has not provided further guidance on the matter. However, the
Regulation of Exchanges Release indicates the preference of the Commis-
sion to expand the NMS to capture these linkages to foreign markets, rather
than to devise a new regulatory regime to account for technological devel-
opments.
4. The Internet Release-March 23, 199869
In its release on The Use of Internet Web Sites to Offer Securities, So-
licit Securities Transactions, or Advertise Investment Services Offshore,
("Internet Release"), the Commission delivered its views on the circum-
stances in which a securities exchange that offers its services over the Inter-
net must register.70 The Internet Release promised to answer the question
of when "sponsorship of an online trading system may give rise to the ille-
gal operation of a private exchange." 7  The Commission's general ap-
proach to the problem was that "when offerors implement adequate
measures to prevent U.S persons from participating in an offshore Internet
offer we would not view the offer as targeted at the United States and thus
would not treat it as occurring in the United States for registration pur-
poses." 72 The Commission further stated that the determination whether
"adequate measures" have been taken depends on the facts and circum-
stances of the particular situation.73
markets. See John C. Coffee, Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internet on Modern
Securities Regulation, 52 Bus. LAW. 1195, 1230 (1997).
69 See Internet Release, supra note 7.
70 See id. at 2. The Internet Release similarly covers internet-based solicitations of secu-
rities-related services and products by offshore issuers, investment companies, broker-
dealers, and investment advisors without triggering the registration requirements of the Secu-
rities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq [hereinafter Securities Act], the Exchange Act,
supra note 6, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 et seq [hereinafter the
Advisers Act], and the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq [herein-
after Investment Company Act]. For a general analysis of the Internet Release, see Michael
M. Mann et al., The Limits of Regulatory Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Emerging Guidelines
for Managing the Risk of Enforcement Action Based On Website Activity, in 1 SECURrrIES
LAW & THE INTERNET: DoiNG BusrNss IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING MARKETPLACE, 225
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE (June-July 1999) [hereinafter SEcuRITIES LAW & THE INTERNET].
71 Brandon Becker & Soo J. Yim, Trading Securities Online: Internet and Other Elec-
tronic Media, in SEcuRmEs LAW & THE INTERNET, supra note 70, at 298 (summarizing
Commission Releases on the issue).
72 Internet Release, supra note 7, at 9.
73 See id.
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Based upon the jurisdictional language of the securities laws,74 the
Internet Release focused on the "targeting" or "soliciting" of U.S. investors
to determine whether Internet activity is taking place "in the United
States."75 In adopting the Targeting Approach, the Commission recognized
that the Internet operates globally without regard to political or geographic
boundaries and that this characteristic of the Internet presents significant is-
sues for the administration of the U.S. securities laws.76 According to one
commentator, the Targeting Approach "eschew[s] the knee-jerk exercise of
jurisdiction over all Internet transactions simply because of the Internet's
inherently cross-border nature."
77
The Internet Release provided the safe harbor from registration for a
foreign exchange sponsoring a Web site that advertises its services, dis-
seminates quotes (including in real time), or permits orders to be directed to
the exchange through its Web site. The Internet Release stated that the
Commission will not require such an exchange to register as long as "the
exchange takes steps reasonably necessary to prevent U.S. persons from di-
recting orders to the market from its Web site."78 The Commission stated
that it would consider "reasonably necessary steps" to be taken, if the ex-
change:
Posts a disclaimer on the Web site affirmatively stating either the coun-
tries in which the exchange's services are directly available, or that the ex-
change's services are not directly available to U.S. persons;
Requires potential members or direct participants in the exchange to state
their residence and mailing address;
Refuses to allow trading on the exchange through any Web site by any
person that the exchange has reason to believe, or that indicates it, is a U.S.
person; and
Refrains from making arrangements to provide U.S. persons with access
to the exchange over the Internet indirectly through its members.
Significantly, the Internet Release only created a safe harbor from reg-
istration. The Internet Release stated that the Commission is considering
the circumstances in which a foreign exchange that provides U.S. persons
with direct trading privileges must register, referring to the Regulation of
74 Section 5 of the Exchange Act requires an exchange to register with the Commission if
"it make[s] use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce for the
purpose of using any facility of an exchange within or subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States to effect any transaction in a security, or to report any such transaction...." 15
U.S.C. § 78e (1997).
75 Internet Release, supra note 7, at 2-3.
76 See id. at 4-6.
77 Mann et al., supra note 70, at 227.
78 Internet Release, supra note 7, at 31.
79Id. at 31-32.
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Exchanges Release, discussed supra.8° In the event that a foreign exchange
is required to register due to Web site transactions with U.S. investors, it
will be subject to the regulatory obligations of the NMS. Therefore, the
Internet Release indicates the Commission's willingness to extend the NMS
to offshore Internet-based exchanges under certain circumstances.
5. The Alternative Trading Systems Release-December 2, 1998e1
The SEC adopted final rules regarding the regulation of alternative
trading systems ("ATS Release") which became effective, with certain ex-
ceptions, on April 21, 1999. The ATS Release, which responded to the
proliferation of ATSs, further indicates the Commission's preference to
work within the parameters of the NMS, rather than propose significant re-
form in the face of revolutionary technology. Before issuance of the ATS
Release, ATSs were private trading systems that centralized and executed
orders, but were not registered with the SEC as exchanges.82 The growth of
ATSs, made possible by technological advances, has been dramatic. The
SEC estimated that over 40 ATSs were in operation at the time of the Re-
lease, and they executed approximately 20% of the orders to trade
NASDAQ-listed securities and 4% of the orders for exchange-listed securi-
ties, an increase from 13% and 1.4% respectively only four years earlier.83
It was conceivable, therefore, that an ATS could become the primary mar-
ket for some issues. However, ATSs were private markets, were regulated
as broker-dealers, and were not registered as exchanges or national associa-
tions. The Commission found that because ATSs functioned as exchanges,
but were not part of the NMS, disparities that affected investor protection
and the operation of the markets as a whole emerged. The Commission
found that the NMS' liquid and competitive markets resulted from linking
them together in order to make the NBBO publicly known, but ATSs oper-
ated outside the NMS.
The ATS Release assessed the activity of ATSs in light of the goals of
the NMS set forth by Congress in the 1975 Amendments.84 For example,
ATSs had no obligation to provide investors a fair opportunity to participate
in their systems or to treat their participants fairly. The Commission found
that trading on ATSs might not have been adequately surveilled for market
80 Id. at n.58. For a discussion of the Regulation of Exchanges Release, see supra notes
55 to 68 and accompanying text.
81 See Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Release No. 34-40760,
63 Fed. Reg. 70844 (Dec. 22, 1998) (Codified at 17 C.F.R. Parts 202, 240, 242, and 249)
[hereinafter ATS Release].
82 For an analysis of the ATS Release, see Howard L. Kramer & Andre E. Owens, SEC
Adopts New Rules Governing Alternative Trading Systems, in SECURITIES LAW & THE
INTERNET, supra note 70, at 599.
83 See ATS Release, supra note 81, at 3-4.
84 See id. at5.
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manipulation and fraud. In addition, ATSs were not required to have sys-
tems capacity sufficient to handle rapid increases in trading volume that can
take place during periods of market stress.
The SEC's solution to these problems involved bringing ATSs under
the regulatory umbrella of the NMS. The Commission accomplished this
by promulgating new Exchange Act Rule 3b-16, which interprets broadly
the statutory definition of "exchange" under Section 3(a)(1) of the Ex-
change Act.85 Pursuant to Section 3(a)(1), the definition of "exchange" in-
cluded a "market place or facilities for bringing together purchasers and
sellers of securities or for otherwise performing with respect to securities
the functions commonly performed by a stock exchange."86 In the ATS
Release, the Commission revised Rule 3b-16 to define these terms to mean
any organization, association, or group of persons that: (1) brings together
the orders of multiple buyers and sellers; and (2) uses established, non-
discretionary methods (whether by providing a trading facility or by setting
rules) under which such orders interact with each other, and the buyers and
sellers entering such orders agree to the terms of a trade.87 As a result,
ATSs fell within the definition of an exchange, whereas they had not before
issuance of the ATS Release. The Commission then gave existing ATSs
the choice to register as an exchange, or to register as broker-dealer and
comply with new Regulation ATS.88
ATSs that opt to register as an exchange would be fully incorporated
into the NMS. 89 For ATSs that opt to be regulated as broker-dealers pursu-
ant to new Regulation ATS, their regulatory obligations correspond to the
percentage of volume they transact in covered securities (generally, listed or
NASDAQ securities). 90 Regulation ATS requires an ATS with five percent
or more of the trading volume in any covered security during four of the
last six months to display the NBBO on the NMS. 91 Moreover, Regulation
85 See id. at 8.
86 Exchange Act § 3(a)(1). 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1) (1994).
87 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-16(a) (2000). In new Rule 3b-16, the Commission excluded
traditional broker-dealer activities. The new Rule 3b-16 expressly excludes "the following
systems from the revised interpretation of 'exchange': (1) systems that merely route orders
to other facilities for execution; (2) systems operated by a single registered market maker to
display its own bids and offers and the limit orders of its customers, and to execute trades
against such orders; and (3) systems that allow persons to enter orders for execution against
the bids and offers of a single dealer." 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-16 (2000).
88 See ATS Release, supra note 81, at 8-10. Regulation ATS is found at 17 C.F.R. §
242.300-303.
89 See id. at 1.
90See id. at 9-11.
91 See id. at 10. Pursuant to Regulation ATS, a system with less than five percent of the
trading volume in all securities it trades is required only to: (1) file with the Commission a
notice of operation and quarterly reports; (2) maintain records, including an audit trail of
transactions; and (3) refrain from using the words "exchange," "stock market," or similar
terms in its name. See id.
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ATS requires ATSs with this level of volume also to display the NBBO of
institutional orders on their systems. These ATSs must comply with the
rules governing execution priorities and obligations that apply to members
of a registered exchange or national securities association to which the ATS
is linked. 92 ATSs with twenty percent or more of the trading volume in any
single security are subject to access requirements similar to those imposed
upon an exchange within the NMS.93
In summary, the existing structure of recent Commission pronounce-
ments on the matter of regulation of the global securities market vis-A-vis
the Internet is: (1) the Regulation of Exchanges Release presents the ques-
tion of how global markets should be regulated and suggests expansion of
the NMS to global market linkages by proposing registration of broker-
dealer access providers and SIPs; (2) the ATS Release defines various types
of domestic electronic trading systems and suggests that some be regulated
as part of the NMS; and (3) the Internet Release creates a very narrow and
territorial safe harbor for foreign exchanges by utilizing the Targeting Ap-
proach. However, the Internet Release leaves open an important issue,
stating that the "Commission is currently considering the question of under
what circumstances a foreign market that provides the ability in the United
States for a U.S. person to trade directly in the market must register as a
U.S. exchange. 94
6. The Ongoing Debate Over the National Market System
The NMS presents several issues that have been debated on a domestic
level, especially leading up to the 1975 Amendments, when the Market
2000 Study was released, and during the development of the ATS Release.
The issues under debate are market consolidation-fragmentation, payment
for order flow, and transparency. This Section of the essay provides an
overview of these relevant issues from a recent Survey.9s This essay sum-
marizes these issues in order to illustrate that the listing of domestic securi-
ties on a foreign exchange, such as the NASDAQ Ten being traded on the
EASDAQ, presents serious inefficiencies due to market fragmentation.
Although these issues concerning the NMS remain unresolved at a domestic
level, they are clearly problematic when viewed from a global perspective.
92 See id. at 9-10.
93 Such ATSs must: (1) grant or deny access based on objective standards established by
the trading system and applied in a non-discriminatory manner; and (2) establish procedures
to ensure adequate systems capacity, integrity, and contingency planning. See id. at 10-11.
94 Interet Release, supra note 7, at n.58 (citing the Regulation of Exchanges Release, su-
pra note 8).
95See Survey, supra note 24, at 19-35, 38-49.
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(a) Consolidation-fragmentation
The consolidation-fragmentation debate derives from the inherently
diametric effects of a multi-market trading environment. Such a trading en-
vironment promotes efficiency through competition among markets, but
multiple market centers also harm liquidity due to the fragmentation of or-
der flow.96 The primary objection to market fragmentation is straightfor-
ward-the greater the fragmentation of orders, the less likely they are to
interact. The result is reduced trading volumes and liquidity, and increased
price impact of trades and bid-ask spreads.97 Moreover, one market center
has observed that market fragmentation reduces the likelihood of obtaining
"best execution" for investors' orders. 98 Finally, other commentators have
observed that relative price discovery and transparency among various mar-
ket centers may cause a free-rider problem for market centers with high
standards.99
Despite these views, there has existed support for the NMS among the
Commission and its staff. The Market 2000 Report takes a favorable view
of efficiencies and service improvements promoted by market competi-
tion.1°° In addition, scholarly support exists for the proposition that inter-
market competition promotes innovation and the improvement of service
for investors. 1 Another commentator has pointed out that ancillary trading
96 See Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, A New Approach to the Regulation of Trading
Across Securities Markets, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1411, 1434 (1996). Market fragmentation has
been defined as the inability of an order in one market to interact with an order in a compet-
ing market. See Hans Stoll, Principles of Trading Market Structure, 6 J. FIN. SERVICES RES.
75, 92 (1992). A consolidated market has been described as one in which all orders interact
regardless of who enters the orders. See Mendelson & Peake, supra note 27, at 454.97 See Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 96, at 1434-35.
98 See Letter from William H. Donaldson, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, New
York Stock Exchange, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Nov. 24, 1992) (commenting on
Market 2000 Study); MARKET 2000 REPORT, supra note 42, at VII-12. The Commission has
stated that "[i]n its purest form, best execution can be thought of as executing a customer's
order so that the customer's total cost or proceeds are the most favorable under the circum-
stances." Payment for Order Flow, Exchange Act Release No. 34-34,902, 57 SEC Docket
2,315, at 2,320 n.27 (Oct. 27, 1994). The Third Circuit went even further in Newton by
stating "the broker-dealer is expected to use reasonable efforts to maximize the economic
benefit to the client in each transaction." Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 270 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc). However, the Commission never has
stated that a broker-dealer is bound exclusively by price considerations in satisfying its best
execution obligations. See Order Execution Obligations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
37,619A, 62 SEC Docket 2,083, at 2,135-38 (Sept. 6, 1996).
99 See Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 96, at 1438.
10o See MARKET 2000 REPORT, supra note 42, at III.
101 See Maureen O'Hara & Jonathan Macey, Regulating Exchanges and Alternative
Trading Systems: A Law and Economics Perspective, at http:llsec.gov/rules/concept/S71679/
ohara/htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2000); see also Hans Stoll, The Causes and Consequences of
the Rise in Third Market and Regional Trading, 19 J. CoaR. L. 509, 516 (1994).
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centers would not receive their current amount of order flow from primary
markets were they not efficient. 102
The empirical evidence on the consolidation-fragmentation debate has
yielded mixed conclusions. 10 3 Statistical studies of the relative quality of
price execution on markets linked by the ITS 1°4 and studies of NYSE exe-
cution compared to OTC and regional market execution105 do not support
the Staff's positive assessment of the NMS's efficiency. Additional studies
find that ancillary markets free-ride off the price discovery of major market
centers.10 6  However, other market studies have concluded that market
fragmentation has reduced the cost of trading 07 and that trading on ancil-
lary exchanges provides services to investors that are not available in pri-
mary markets.10
(b) Payment for Order Flow
The debate over payment for order flow ("POF") has been described as
"one of the most intractable and pressing issues in securities regulation to-
day. 109 The multi-market environment of the NMS permits the existence
of POF, a practice in which a securities market will pay a broker between
one and three cents for each order a broker routes to it.10 While one group
of commentators deride these payments as "kickbacks," m another camp
has argued that POF is merely a symptom of the competition between mar-
ket centers rather than broker-dealers 2 and is a natural outgrowth of this
competition.1 3 An additional member of this camp has noted that a pri-
102 See Stoll, supra note 101, at 514.
103 See Survey, supra note 24, at 25-29.
104 See generally Charles Lee, Market Integration and Price Execution for NYSE-Listed
Securities, 48 J. FIN. 1009 (1993).
10 5 See generally Blume & Goldstein, supra note 39.
106 See generally Kenneth L. Garbade & William L. Silber, A Study of Dually-Traded Se-
curities, 61 REv. ECON. & STAT. 455 (1970); Joel Hasbrouck, One Security, Many Markets:
Determining the Contribution to Price Discovery, 50 J. FIN. 1175, 1197 (1995).
107 See Thomas H. McInish & Robert A. Wood, Competition, Fragmentation and Market
Quality, in Tim INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY
63 (Andrew W. Lo, ed., 1996).
108 See Lee, supra note 104, at 1012.
109 Ferrell, supra note 27, at 1. See generally Note, The Perils of Payment for Order
Flow, 107 HARV. L. REv 1675-92 (1994).
110 See Ferrell, supra note 27, at 1.
111 See id.
112 See Survey, supra note 24, at 30 (citing Lois Lightfoot, Peter Martin, Mark Peterson,
and Eric Sirri, Preferencing and Market Quality on U.S. Equity Exchanges, Paper presented
at NBER Conference (July 17, 1997)).
113 See id. at 31 (citing Inducements For Order Flow, A Report To the Board of Govern-
ers, National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. 25 (1991)).
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mary market in a security would also offer POF were it efficient for the
primary market to do so.P
4
Aside from the criticism that POF may represent a breach of fiduciary
duty by a broker-dealer to its clients, it clearly presents problems of effi-
ciency. 5 Professor Ferrell has correctly observed that the NYSE is sys-
tematically unable to offer POF; therefore, it is disadvantaged by non-price
competition.1 6 Consequently, he argues that dealers will avoid routing or-
ders to auction markets, notwithstanding the opportunity to obtain better
price execution for a client. Even if all markets could offer POF, moreover,
market distortion in order routing would still exist due to the inability of
markets to quickly adjust the size of their POF payments to reflect relative
market efficiencies. Finally, he argues that the inferior execution resulting
from POF discriminatorily effects small, unsophisticated investors.
1 7
As with the consolidation-fragmentation debate, empirical studies on
POF produce divergent conclusions. One study found that POF tended to
divert the orders of uniformed investors from the NYSE to a regional ex-
change or the OTC market.118 In contrast, another study of trading data
found that the conclusion that ancillary markets "divert informationless or-
der flow away from the NYSE" may be "premature.11 9
(c) Transparency
The issue of transparency within the NMS has remained a subject of
study.1 20 Researchers have focused on the dissemination of information to
market participants concerning the size, type, and source of orders and
trades. One set of analyses has focused on the degree to which asymmetric
information increases bid-ask spreads within the NMS using theoretical and
empirical methodologies. Other studies of transparency compare order
114 See Stoll, supra note 101, at 515.
115 See Ferrell, supra note 27, at 6-9.
116 See id. at 29-36.
17 See id. at 35-36; see also Survey, supra note 24, at 33-34; John C. Coffee, Comment,
in THE INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY, supra
note 107, at 63 (commenting on Mclnish & Wood, supra note 107).
is See generally David Easily et al., Cream-Skimming or Profit-Sharing? The Curious
Role of Purchased Order Flow, 51 J. FIN. 811 (1996) (concluding that significant differences
exist between the information content in orders executed on the N.Y.S.E. and the Cincinnati
Stock Exchange, and that these differences are consistent with "cream skimming").
119 Robert H. Battlio, Third Market Broker-Dealers: Cost Competitors or Cream Skim-
mers? 52 J. FIN. 341, 344 (1997).
120 See Survey, supra note 24, at 38-49 (collecting sources).
121 See, e.g., Thomas E. Copeland & Dan Gala, Information Effects on the Bid-Ask
Spread, 38 J. FIN. 1457 (1983); Lawrence R. Glosten, Components of the Bid-Ask Spread
and the Statistical Properties of Transaction Prices, 42 J. FIN. 1293 (1987); Hans R. Stoll,
Inferring the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread: Theory and Empirical Evidence, 44 J. FIN.
115, 132 (1989).
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and dealer markets within the NMS. 22 Another researcher has studied the
effects of transparency on the efficiency, bid-ask spreads, volatility, and li-
quidity of a market." Notwithstanding the substantial research on the is-
sue, no unequivocal conclusion has emerged concerning the transparency
benefits of the NMS. The reason for the nebulous results lies in the infinite
variety of independent variables inherent in the concept of transparency.
The author of the Survey asserted:
In conclusion, the foregoing survey of the literature on market transparency re-
veals that transparency is a much more complex issue than is generally as-
sumed by market regulators and commentators. The net welfare effects of
greater transparency are ambiguous. As the literature reveals, transparency has
different effects depending on the particular investor, market, and security at
issue. Therefore, a one-size-fits-all approach to transparency regulation is un-
desirable. 124
(d) Conclusion
The NMS has created cumbersome regulations whose optimality has
neither been proved nor discredited. As a result of the recent Releases re-
sponding to new technologies, the SEC has made the NMS system of regu-
lation even more complicated by creating fine distinctions among
participants: broker-dealers, access providers, SIPs, ATSs, and exchanges.
However, these Releases do not address issues connected with fragmenta-
tion, POF, and transparency when domestic issues trade on foreign ex-
changes.
B. Market Background: A Global Securities Marketplace
This Section describes the extent that securities markets have become
"globalized" during the last decade. A review of this phenomenon is im-
portant because it contrasts sharply with the Targeting Approach. Moreo-
ver, the extraordinary developments in global securities markets contrast
sharply with the SEC's incremental modifications to the NMS. These de-
velopments are the increase in transnational equity trading and listing, the
consolidation of physical markets, and the proliferation of ATSs.
1. Globalization of Equity Markets
In 1998, the U.S. capital markets accounted for approximately one-
half of global market capitalization of domestic companies. According to
the International Federation of Stock Exchanges ("FIBV"), the ten largest
1
2 See Marco Pagano & Ailsa Roell, Transparency and Liquidity: A Comparison ofAuc-
tion and Dealer Markets with Informed Trading, 51 J. FIN. 579 (1996); Ananth Madhavan,
Security Prices and Market Transparency, 5 J. FIN. INTERMED. 255 (1996).
1 See Madhavan, supra note 122.
124 See Survey, supra note 24, at 49.
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exchanges by market capitalization for common and preferred shares of
domestic companies were:
Table 1
The 10 laroest stock markets In the world
















t See FIBVStatistlcs, at http:/fibv.comstatistics.asp (last visited Mar. 23,2000) (excluding closed-end funds, rights,
warrants, and convertibles).
The following table provides valuable perspective on the international
character of the U.S. equity markets. Although the percentage of foreign
listings on the U.S. markets is small relative to the percentage on certain
other markets, the large size of the U.S. equity markets relative to the rest
of the world make them very international in character.
Table 2
The 10 laroest stock markets In the world
by averae daily turnover: foreign
comoany tradlno and lstlna
(US$ million for average daily turnover)
Foreign
Turnover
As%Of Number of 1997
1997 1997 Foreign Foreign
Average Average Companies Listings
Dally Dally as% of
Turnover Turnover 1986 1990 1997 Total
NYSE 15,829 8.4% 59 96 355 13.5%
NASDAQ 12,279 13.7% 244 256 454 8.3%
London 5,451 58.1% 534 613 467 18.6%
Paris 5,010 2.2% 195 226 184 20.0%
Taiwan 3,585 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0%
Germany 2,925 4.5% 181 234 1,996 74.0%
Toyko 2,455 0.2% 52 125 60 3.2%
Switzerland 1,559 5.0% 194 240 212 49.5%
Toronto 836 0.2% 51 66 58 4.1%
Italy 557 0.1% 0 0 4 1.7%
Source: FIB\V
t Reprinted in HAL S. SCOTT & PHILLP I. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY
AND REGULATION 2-17 (7h ed., forthcoming) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL FINANCE]. Stock market size
determined by 1994 Turnover. Average Daily Turnover determined by total turnover divided by 365.
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2. Increase of Cross-Border Securities Offerings and Transactions
As Tables 3 and 4 illustrate, the international equity offerings and the
market for cross-border equities that became significant in the mid-1980s














Source: OECD and IMF.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Tabl F.T.-0.a, "International Capital Markets Statistics"
(1996), OECD Financial Market Trends (Nov. 1997), and International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets:
Developments, Prospects, and Policy Issues 189 (Aug. 1995), all reprinted in SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 1, at 18.













1987 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
1,377.8 1,562.6 1,390.9 1,322.5 1,404.9 2,266.1 2,550.0
508.6 582.9 873.9 779.1 968.7 1,547.5 2,000.0
16.4 86.6 3.2 100.6 53.7 196.3 119.6
70.9 117.5 128.4 83.7 91.0 95.1 156.2
Source: IMF*
"International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and Policy Issues 189 (Aug.
1995), reprintedin SCOTr& WLLoNs, supra note , at 21. Data for 1994 is estimated. "Gross Equity Flows" are the
sum of all purchases and sales in a foreign security. "Net Equity Flows" indicate new money inflows, the difference
between the purchases and the sales of foreign equity. See id.
125 See SCOT & WELLONS, supra note t, at 20.
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To provide a further perspective on the internationalization of the U.S.
markets, foreign issuers and investors are attracted to the NYSE in substan-
tial numbers, as the facts the NYSE has released indicate. 126 Between 1980
and 1995, the total financial activity by U.S. persons in foreign securities
grew from $53.1 billion to $2,573.6 billion, representing an increase of over
4700%.127
3. Consolidation of Physical Securities Markets and the Proliferation of
Electronic Trading Systems
Physical securities markets are consolidating. In the United States, this
has been a long-term trend. There were 34 stock exchanges in the United
States at the passage of the Exchange Act,128 compared to seven market
centers at present. In Europe, this consolidation began in the late 1990s and
continues to date. Demands by European investors and market participants
demanding market consolidation to reduce the costs of trading, clearance,
and settlement in an environment of Euro-denominated, cross-border trad-
ing have caused this recent trend. 129 This consolidation appears to be rapid
and sometimes frenetic. In February 2000, for example, the London Stock
Exchange and Brussels Exchange announced their interest in merging with
another European bourse.130 By March 2000, the plan had changed. Paris
Bourse S.A., the Amsterdam Exchange and Brussels Exchange announced
their intent to merge into a company called Euronext N.V.13  As Table 5
illustrates, there presently exist a number of proposed cross-border alli-
126 In 1998, 43 non-U.S. companies were listed on the N.Y.S.E.. This brought the total
number of companies to 379-more than three times the number of such companies listed 5
years ago. See http://www.nyse.com/intemational/internationalco.htm (last visited Mar. 22,
2000). Companies from 48 countries are listed on the N.Y.S.E.. See http://www.nyse.con
content/faqs (last visited Mar. 22, 2000). The global market capitalization of the non-U.S.
companies is US $5.5 trillion. See id.
127 See SEcuRITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, 1996 SECURIiES INDUSTRY FACT BOOK 67
(1996).
1
28 See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, S. REP.
No. 73-1455, at 5 (1934).
129 See London Exchange Signals Its Interest in European Merger, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3,
2000, at C22. See generally SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note t, at 14-47 to 14-53.
130 See London Exchange Signals Its Interest in European Merger, supra note 129, at
C22; see also John Carreyrou, Belgian Exchange's 15.2% Drop This Year Fuels Worries
Over Small Bourses in the New Europe, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2000, at C14. Earlier this
year, an alliance of eight European bourses was announced, but the merger has not been
completed. See id. But see LSE Abandons Plan to Merge With Frankfurt, WALL ST. J., Sept.
13, 2000, at A21.
131 See French, Dutch and Belgian Bourses Set Plans to Join Forces as New Company,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2000, at B14. Under this plan, equities would be traded in Paris, de-
rivatives would be traded in Amsterdam, and clearing and settlement would occur in Brus-
sels. See id.
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ances.13 2  Finally, as described in the Introduction to this essay, the
EASDAQ is operating as a pan-European exchange.
133
In contrast to physical exchanges, the number of electronic trading
markets is proliferating. As noted supra Section ll(A)(5), electronic ex-
changes handle 4% of orders in NYSE-listed securities and 20% of all order
flow in the OTC market. In its recent request for comment, the Commis-
sion noted that in the market for NASDAQ equities trading interest is di-
vided among various market centers.134  Several ATSs operate electronic
limit order books for the trading of NASDAQ equities. In September 1999,
nine of these ATSs collectively accounted for 28.0% of trades in NASDAQ
issues.135 See Table 5, infra.
C. Technological Background: Securities Market Activity on the Internet
1. Basic Architecture of the Internet
This Section describes the technical background of the Internet, be-
cause the architecture of the Internet is part and parcel with the regulatory
issues concerning its use. The titles of several recent publications involving
securities transactions on the Internet have questioned whether securities
activity on the Internet is, or can be, regulated: Who's Watching?: It's a
wild world out there in cyberspace, and the investment police can't keep up
with it; 136 Taming the Frontier?: An Evaluation of the SEC's Regulation of
Internet Securities Trading Systems; 137 and As Huge Changes Roil the Mar
132See SECuarrIEs LAW & THE INTERNET, supra note 70, at 17. But see WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 20, 2000, at B 14 (describing mergers illustrated in Table 5 as being "considered dead in
all but name"). For further detail on the evolving alliances among Europe's trading centers,
see SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note *, at 14-49 - 14-53 (collecting sources); see also Sylvia
Ascarelli, Link to Nasdaq Possible in Merger of European Bourses, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24,
2000, at A22 (reporting that a possible merger between the London Stock Exchange and
Deutsche B6rse could include a linkage to the NASDAQ).
133 See The Pan-European Exchange, supra note 1.
134 See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by the
New York Stock Exchange, Inc. to Rescind Exchange Rule 390; Commission Request for
Comment on Issues Relating to Market Fragmentation, Release No. 34-42450, 71 SEC
Docket 1702, at 1706 (February 23, 2000) [hereinafter Fragmentation Release].
135 See id. Nevertheless, the Commission believes that the U.S. markets for listed equities
currently reflect a fairly low degree of fragmentation. As evidence, the Commission cites
that in September 1999, 74.4% of the trades and 83.9% of the share volume in N.Y.S.E.-
listed equities were executed on the N.Y.S.E., and that approximately 68.7% of the trades
and 70.5% of the share volume in Amex-listed securities were executed on the Amex. See
id. at 7. The Commission correctly observed that "these percentages could change after the
rescission of off-board trading restrictions such as N.Y.S.E. Rule 390." Id.
136 See Andrew Fraser, Who's Watching?: It's a wild world out there in cyberspace, and
the investment police can't keep up with it, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1999, at R17.
137 See Andrew Thompson, Taming the Frontier?: An Evaluation of the SEC's Regula-
tion of Internet Securities Trading Systems, 1999 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 165 (1999).
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ket, Some Ask: Where is the SEC?38 This Section of the essay will re-
spond that Internet-based securities markets are eminently subject to regu-
lation, although the Commission utilizes the tools at its disposal to do so in
a very general manner.
Communications through the Internet travel through the World Wide
Web ("Web") in the form of bulletin boards, e-mail and personal broadcast
networks. 139 A person with a computer and access to the Web can make
Internet communications from anywhere in the world.140 The Web, quite
simply, "is a series of documents stored in different computers all over the
Internet.'' Approximately 304 million people currently use the Inter-
net,'42 and the number of host computers has been estimated at 40 mil-
lion.
143
Hypertext markup language ("HTML') allows Internet users to move
rapidly from one of the countless documents on the Web to another.' 44
Each document on the Web has a unique IMTL address that corresponds to
the computer storing it. If the Internet user knows the address of a docu-
ment that she wishes to view, she can access it by typing its address into her
Web browser. Internet users also can move from a viewed document to an-
other through the use of a hyperlink.145 A hyperlink is usually highlighted
text or a box describing the contents of other documents. If the viewer of
one document wants to view the contents of another document described by
the highlighted text or box, then she simply "clicks" on the highlighted text
or box, which automatically sends a request for the Internet user to the
HTML address of that document.
138 See Scot J. Paltrow et al., Beat Cop: As Huge Changes Roil the Market, Some Ask:
Where is the SEC?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 1999, at Al.
139 For information on the use, structure and history of the Internet, see Barry M. Leiner
et al., A Brief History of the Internet, at http://info.www.org/internetlhistory (last visited
Mar. 23, 2000). See generally Developments In the Law: The Law of Cyberspace, 112
HARV. L. Rnv. 1574, 1577-80 (1999) [hereinafter Developments].
140 Individuals access the Internet through a computer that has a direct link to the Internet
or through a modem that connects a remote user via a telephone line to the computer of an
Internet Service Provider [hereinafter IPS] that has a direct link to the Internet. See ACLU v.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 832-33 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
141 id.
142 For current statistics on Internet use, see http://www.nua.iefsurveys/how-many-onlin
elindex.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2000).
143 See Developments, supra note 139 at 1579 n.16.
144 See generally id. at 1579-80.
145 See generally id. at 1580.
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2. Explosive Growth of Securities Transactions Over the Internet
The growth of investing over the Internet has exploded. 146 In 1999, on-
line brokerage assets totaled about $415 billion, an amount that is estimated
to grow by more than sevenfold to $3 trillion in 2003. The 3.7 million on-
line accounts established by 1997 increased to 9.7 million accounts by the
second quarter of 1999. These accounts have become more active, from
executing approximately 100,000 trades per day in the second quarter of
1996 to over one-half million in the second quarter of 1999. The percent-
age of equity orders transmitted on-line has grown to 15.9 percent of all eq-
uity trades in the first quarter of 1999.
In response to the dramatic increase in securities-related activity over
the Internet, the Technical Committee of IOSCO approved the Report of
IOSCO's Internet Task Force ("IOSCO Internet Report") on September 28,
1998.47 The IOSCO Internet Report succinctly describes the characteris-
tics of the Internet that provide new opportunities for investors and the se-
curities industry, but that also create new challenges for regulators. The
five characteristics of the Internet most relevant to this essay are that it pro-
vides: (a) a widespread and instantaneous means of communication; (b) at
low cost; (c) which is interactive in nature; (d) that occurs in a decentralized
medium; and (e) that is subject to specific forms of regulation.
(a) Widespread and Instantaneous Communication
First, the Internet creates a platform for widespread and simultaneous
communication. Due to the HTML format, the Internet provides a vast
audience for the offer of securities, investment advice, and stock exchange
services. Issuers, securities service providers, and stock exchanges can es-
tablish easily a Web site or electronic bulletin board on which a global
audience can obtain information almost instantaneously. Market partici-
pants or exchanges commonly provide quotations for securities on their
Web sites. Securities market participants and investors can also dissemi-
nate information over the Internet through a File Transfer Protocol ("FTP"),
which transmits files rather than messages, between computers or through
electronic messages ("e-mail").
146 See SEC, Special Report of Commissioner Laura Unger to the Commission, On-Line
Brokerage: Keeping Apace of Cyberspace (Nov. 1999), at http://www.sec.gov (last visited
Mar. 23, 2000) [hereinafter Keeping Apace of Cyberspace]; Isaac C. Hunt, The Internet and
the Securities Markets, Speech at the XXIV Annual Conference of the IOSCO, (May 22-29,
1999) (citing recent statistics on internet trading); see also Greg Ip & Rebecca Buckman,
The Web Snares Investors, Shifting Wall Street's Focus, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2000, at R6.
147 IOSCO, Securities Activity on the Internet Report (Sept. 1998), at http://www.iosco.
org/docs-public/1998-intemet-security.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2000) [hereinafter IOSCO
Internet Report].
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(b) Low Cost Communication
Second, the Internet permits the dissemination of information to a do-
mestic or international audience at very low cost, typically the telecommu-
nications cost of connecting to a local ISP and the fee charged by the ISP.
These low costs exponentially increase the amount of information that is
available to investors globally.
(c) Interactive Communications
Third, the Internet can be an interactive form of communication. The
Internet provides a platform on which an investor can use hyperlinks to read
a solicitation for the sale of a security, effectuate an investment decision,
transmit an order, receive confirmation, and pay for securities by connect-
ing once to an ISP.
(d) Decentralized Medium of Communication
The fourth characteristic of the Internet described by the IOSCO Inter-
net Report deserves further explanation due to its technological basis. The
Internet is a generally "open" network that does not have a centralized lo-
cation from which it can be controlled. This is because, as noted above, the
architecture of the Internet consists of a decentralized system comprised of
millions of computers on the periphery of the system that hold documents
and execute the system's operations. Once one has access to the Internet,
one has access to all HTMLs, except for those limited to specific users in
possession of the appropriate access code.
The decentralized nature of the Internet becomes apparent by a sum-
mary of its history.148 The ARPANet was established pursuant to a feder-
ally funded communications project in the late 1960s. ARPANet aimed to
establish a communications loop for computers in remote locations to
transmit data to each other. The architects of the ARPANet sought to create
a "self-maintaining series of redundant links between computers and com-
puter networks... designed to allow vital research and communications to
continue even if portions of the network were damaged, say, in a war.
In the years following the creation of the Internet, smaller networks, such as
BITNet, CSNet, and Usenet, came into existence and became compatible
with the ARPANET. The Internet is a result of the linkage of these net-
works into a global communications network of over 40 million computers.
Due to the decentralized architecture of the Internet, it is easy to under-
stand why some commentators have concluded that it is not possible to
148 See generally Leiner et al., supra note 139; see also Developments, supra note 139, at
1578-79.
149ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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regulate activity over the Internet. 50 In fact, the non-jurisdictional medium
of the Internet, in which communicators are identified by HTML addresses,
rather than geographic locations, makes the Internet difficult for sovereigns
to regulate.15' The corollary of this argument, that the separation of real
space from cyberspace means that sovereigns should defer to self-regulation
by cyberspace participants,1 52 however, has not withstood empirical scru-
tiny.
(e) The SEC's Ability to Regulate by Code
This essay adopts the position that the SEC can and should regulate se-
curities transactions over the Internet through a code-based approach. l5 4 As
Professor Lessig explains:
In real space, we recognize how laws regulate-through constitutions, statutes,
and other legal codes. In cyberspace, we must understand how code regu-
lates-how the software and hardware that make cyberspace what it is regulate
cyberspace as it is. As William Mitchell puts it, this code is cyberspace's
"law." Code is law. 55
Certainly, "[s]ome architectures of cyberspace are more regulable than
others; some architectures enable better control than others.' 1 6 The con-
cept of "open" versus "closed" communications architecture is signifi-
cant.1 57 The Internet lies at the open extreme of the spectrum, as it is a
system of protocols that are non-proprietary and that require no personal
identification for a person to access. At the opposite extreme lies a closed
150 See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyber-
space, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1375 (1996) (concluding that: "The rise of an electronic me-
dium that disregards geographical boundaries throws the law into disarray by creating
entirely new phenomena that need to become the subject of clear legal rules but cannot be
governed, satisfactorily, by any current territorial based sovereign.").
151 As Johnson and Post put it, cyberspace exists "everywhere and nowhere in particular,
and only on the Net." Id. at 1375; see also James D.A. Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Sur-
veillance, Sovereignty, and Hard-Wired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 177, 178 (1997) (stat-
ing that "the technology of the medium, the geographical distribution of its users, and the
nature of its content all make the Internet specially resistant to state regulation").
152 See Johnson & Post, supra note 150, at 1393.
153 See, e.g., Timothy S. Wu, Note, Cyberspace Sovereignty? - The Internet and the In-
ternational System, 10 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 647, 654-55 (1997) (describing examples of
Internet regulation in China and Singapore); Boyle, supra note 151, at 190 (stating govern-
ments regulate the Internet through "privately deployed, materially based, technological
methods of surveillance and censorship").
154 This position contrasts with that of Johnson and Post. The foundation of this position
is set forth in Professor Lessig's recent work LAWRENCE LESIG, CODE AND THE OTHER
LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999) [hereinafter CODE].
155 See id. at 6 (citing WILLIAM J. MITCHELL, CITY OF BITS: SPACE, PLACE AND THE
INFOBAHN (1995) (emphasis in original).
156 Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
157 See id. at 27; see also id. at 46-105 (describing the open architecture of the Internet).
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proprietary network, which tightly controls access only to those with the
proper access code or even a proprietary terminal. To appreciate the vast
difference between open and closed systems, consider the regulatory impli-
cations for a transnational stock exchange that permits remote trading
privileges to only those with one of the exchange's terminals and the ap-
propriate access codes versus an exchange that would expose an order from
any individual with Internet access. As discussed further, exchanges com-
monly control access by the former architectural design, because the latter
architecture is too open to support a workable securities exchange.
In contrast to regulating a system by means of access codes, there is no
simple way to regulate the Internet because it is not possible to determine
the identity of users, to locate their geographical location, or to classify the
data that they want to access. Simply put, "there is no simple way to zone
cyberspace." 58 This inherent limit derives from the Internet's foundation
upon simple protocols, known as the TCP/IP suite. The TCP/IP suite in-
cludes the protocols for receiving information from the Web, called Internet
Protocols ("IP"). The IP, however, only includes two pieces of information,
the HTML of the information, that is, the address of the computer from
which the information is being sent, and the address of the destination. The
architecture of the Internet was not designed to include information such as
the geographic location of the Internet user or whether the Internet user is,
for example, a "qualified institutional buyer." 159
This essay attempts to set forth the architectural outline of the neces-
sary elements of a global, Internet-based securities market, and an example
of how the Commission could utilize code in efforts to exercise traditional
objectives of securities regulation over such a market. Indeed, the SEC al-
ready regulates code in a very general form by promulgating certain stan-
dards for the systems architecture of market participants.' 60 For example,
58 Id. at 28.
1
59 See Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(1) (2000) (defining "qualified in-
stitutional buyer").
10 The SEC possesses ample statutory authority over the code of market participants.
For example, Exchange Act Section 6(b)(1) provides that an exchange shall not be registered
unless the Commission determines that the "exchange is so organized and has the capacity to
carry out the purposes of this Act." 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(1) (Supp. 2000) (emphasis added). In
addition, Exchange Act Section 3(a)(37) defines "records" as "accounts, correspondence,
memorandums, tapes, discs, papers, books, and other documents or transcribed information
of any type, whether expressed in ordinary or machine language." 15 U.S.C § 78c(a)(37)
(1994) (emphasis added). Section 17(a)(1) of the Exchange Act provides that "[e]very na-
tional securities exchange, member thereof, broker or dealer who transacts business in secu-
rities through the medium of any such member, registered securities association, registered
broker or dealer, registered municipal securities dealer, registered information processor,
registered transfer agent, and registered clearing agency and the Municipal Securities Rule-
making Board shall make and keep for prescribed periods such records.. .as the Commission
prescribes as necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or
otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Act." 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a)(1) (1994); see also
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Investment Company Act Rule 17f-5(c)(1)(i) requires an "Eligible Foreign
Custodian" of a registered investment company to subject foreign assets to
reasonable care, in consideration of all relevant factors, including "security
and data protection practices."'161 In 1997, the SEC amended Exchange Act
Rule 17a-4 by modifying the record keeping requirements for broker-
dealers to permit the use of electronic medium.162 Rather than specifying
the type of storage technology a broker-dealer must use, the amended rule
prescribed the architectural standards that electronic storage media must
satisfy. In particular, amended Rule 17a-4 permits broker-dealers to use
"optical storage technology," which is defined as technology that" allows
for digital data recording in a non-rewritable, non-erasable format .... Non-
rewritable optical storage records digital information by employing a laser
heat source to bum a pattern on a metallic film on a disk surface that can
hold billions of bytes of data."'
63
Another example of regulation by code was the Commission's treat-
ment of the "Y2K Problem," the possibility that the computer systems of
broker-dealers would read January 1, 2000 as January 1, 1900, or cause
systems failure.'64 The Commission amended Exchange Act Rule 17a-5 to
require covered broker-dealers to file Form BD-Y2K, which sets forth a
summary of the efforts of the broker-dealer's personnel to solve the Y2K
Problem at the firm.165  On Form BD-Y2K, a broker-dealer must report
material exceptions identified during internal and external systems testing
that were unresolved. The SEC left to the discretion of broker-dealers the
determination of a material exception.
With regard to exchanges, the Commission has a long history or setting
standards for computer capacity in its Policy Review Statements, including
capacity estimates, the use of stress tests, and the evaluation of third-party
15 U.S.C. § 80a-30(a)(1) (1994) (analogous provision for investment companies); 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-4 (1994) (analogous provision for investment advisers).
The Commission also has literal statutory authority over those who make Internet com-
munications from the United States pursuant to the securities laws' common jurisdictional
requirement that the subject of SEC regulation use "any means or instrumentality of inter-
state commerce or of the mails." E.g., Exchange Act, 15 USC § 78j (1994). The Exchange
Act defines "interstate commerce" as "trade, commerce, transportation, or communication
among the several States, or between any foreign country and any State, or between any
State and any place or ship outside thereof." 15 USC § 78c(a)(17) (1994) (emphasis added).
161 17 C.F.R. § 270.17f-5(c)(1)(i) (2000).
162 Reporting Requirements for Brokers or Dealers Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, Release No. 34-38245, 63 SEC Docket 1982 (Feb. 5, 1997).
163 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4 (2000).
'64 See SEC, Reports to be Made by Certain Brokers and Dealers, Release No. 34-40162,
67 SEC Docket 950 (July 2, 1998). The Release was amended Exchange Act Rules by add-
ing new subparagraph (5) to Rule 17a-5(e).
165 See id.
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relationships. 166 Regarding broker-dealers, the Staff has also set forth gen-
eral guidance on systems capacity in a Staff Bulletin.1 67 The Staff Bulletin
noted that in addition to average-to-heavy order volumes, registrants should
have the capacity to handle exceptional volumes that are several times the
average. The Staff Bulletin emphasized that broker-dealers should conduct
capacity planning regularly and provide alternative backup or investor ac-
cess points during periods of exceptional volatility. Finally, the Staff Bul-
letin warned that a registrant that accepts orders without adequate systems
capacity may be in violation of the federal securities laws.
Most recently, the Commission proposed new rules, 15b7-2 and 17Ad-
20, which continued the Commission's pattern of promulgating standards
for systems in general fashion.1 68 Pursuant to the proposed rules, registered
broker-dealers and transfer agents must establish and maintain operational
capability to ensure the prompt and accurate entry of customer orders, and
the execution, comparison, allocation, clearance, and settlement of securi-
ties transactions. Proposed Rule 15b-7 defines the term "operational capa-
bility" to include the following broker-dealer systems operations: controls
in data center computer operations, such as facilities management; controls
regarding infrastructure and physical hazards; and staffing and operations
practices of the data center. In addition, the definition includes data secu-
rity practices and policies; controls, practices, and policies to ensure ade-
quate development and maintenance of information systems; capacity
planning and testing to ensure the continual capability of systems to handle
varying amounts of data in a timely fashion; and contingency planning. In
this regard, the Commission showed particular interest in the plans and pro-
cedures to resolve systems failures and to ensure investor protection in the
event of systems failure. The proposed rule states clearly that it does not
address an occasional delay or outage; however, as the rule only sets forth
general standards, it is uncertain how severe a systems outage must be to
prompt a Commission enforcement action.
3. Multiple Transmission Media for Order Flow
Professor Tamar Frankel correctly observed that the advent of corpo-
rate disclosure over the Internet merely changes the medium through which
16 See, e.g., SEC, Automated Systems of Self-Regulatory Organizations ("ARP I"), Re-
lease No. 34-27445, 44 SEC Docket 1582 (Nov. 16, 1989); Automated Systems of Self-
Regulatory Organizations ("ARP II"), Release No. 34-29185, 48 SEC Docket 1345 (May 9,
1991).
167 See SEC Staff Bulletin No. 8 (MR) (Sep. 9, 1998).
168 See SEC, Operational Capability Requirements of Registered Broker-Dealers and
Transfer Agents And Year 2000 Compliance, Release No. 34-41142, 50 Fed. Reg. 64,
12,127 (Mar. 5, 1999).
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disclosure is made, not necessarily the content. 69 The same is true of the
medium of transmission for order flow. Investors and market participants
have been using a variety of cross-border telecommunications media for
some time. These media include telephone, facsimile, propriety data link-
ages, and the Internet.170  Table 6, below, illustrates how intermediated
trades require two communications linkages. The first links the investor to
the intermediary, one or more broker-dealers. The second links the inter-
mediary to the exchange (assuming that the trade is not internalized). In-
vestors have a variety of communications media at their disposal for the
first linkage. An investor might transmit an order to a broker-dealer by vis-
iting a brokerage office in person, telephoning, or sending a facsimile. As
noted above, the trading environment has changed recently due to the in-
creased use of the Internet for the first linkage.
For the second linkage, from the broker-dealer to the exchange, two
general types of transmission media exist. Many markets use telephone to
send voice instructions to the exchange floor. The Stock Exchange of Hong
Kong Stock, Jakarta Stock Exchange, Philippine Stock Exchange, Stock
Exchange of Singapore, and the Chicago Board of Options Exchange use
this telephone method. 71 Other equity markets only employ transmission
via proprietary terminals. These markets include the Stock Exchange of
Thailand, the PFTS OTC Market of Ukraine, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Ex-
change, the Taiwan Stock Exchange, the National Stock Exchange of India,
the Bombay Stock Exchange of India, the Canadian Venture Exchange, the
Toronto Stock Exchange, and the Paris Bourse.' 72 The U.S. equity markets
utilise both methods, although order flow is increasingly transmitted via
proprietary terminals. However, a trader at a Wall Street firm could con-
ceivably receive an order by telephone while at the office, walk to the
NYSE, and verbally transmit the order to a specialist on the floor of the
NYSE. This analysis suggests that from a global perspective, a number of
channels in the first or second linkage are "open" systems; that is, investors
theoretically can access the systems. Telephone, facsimile, and Internet
transmissions share this characteristic of "openness."
169 See Tamar Frankel, The Internet, Securities Regulation, and the Theory of Law, 73
CI.-KENT L. REv. 1319, 1335 (1998).
170 See Regulation of Exchanges Release, supra note 8, at 168 ("This [trading] may be
accomplished in a variety of ways, including through the use of proprietary software, leased
lines or a public network such as the Intemet."); see also MAR=ET 2000 REPORT, supra note
42, at VII-1.
171 See e-mail from John Ruckrich, Principal Consultant, Pricewaterhouse Coopers, to
author (Mar. 23, 2000) (on file with author).
172 See id. The Canadian Venture Exchange was created by the merger of the Vancouver
and Alberta stock exchanges on November 29, 1999. See About the Canadian Venture Ex-
change, at http://www.cdnx.ca/AboutCDNXI (last visited Apr. 20, 2000).
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Table 6
Dual LUnkeacs for Order Flow
INVESTOR i TRANSMISSION OF ORDER FLOW MARKET
Linkage 1 Linkage 2
° I BROKER-DEALERYI ,
Investor
O Foreign or Domestic Market = Exchange or
ATS for stocks or options of U.S. companies
Voice, Phone, Fax, Proprietary or Internet
Communications Transmission
4. Multiple Forms of Cross-Border Order Flow
A domestic investor purchasing domestic securities on a foreign ex-
change may use a variety of channels. As explained below, the method a
domestic investor uses to transmit the order determines whether the bid or
transaction is reported on the NMS. The possible channels of order flow
are: (a) from a domestic investor to a foreign market without domestic in-
termediation; (b) from a domestic investor to a foreign market through a
foreign intermediary; (c) from a domestic investor through a domestic bro-
ker-dealer and an affiliated or unaffiliated foreign broker-dealer to a foreign
market; and (d) from a foreign investor directly or through a foreign inter-
mediary to a foreign market.
(a) Order Flow to a Foreign Market Without Domestic Intermediation
The simplest form of order flow travels from a domestic investor to a
foreign market without intermediation. For the last several years, "technol-
ogy and the emergence of screen-based trading has made it possible for ex-
changes to establish terminals outside their home country to facilitate
foreign-investor access to their markets." 173 Remote and unintermediated
cross-border trading takes place by using such technology in conjunction
with a trading floor:
For example, in September 1994, the Amsterdam Stock Exchange intro-
duced new electronic trading facilities. This enhanced technology enables
members of the system that permits banks and broker-dealers to effect whole-
sale trades on-screen using the Automatic Interprofessional Dealing System
Amsterdam ("AIDA"). This system permits exchange participants to enter
bids and offers and to execute trades via a remote computer located in their of-
173MARKET 2000 REPORT, supra note 42, at VII-A.
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fices. Similarly, Frankfures Deutsche B6rse provides remote access in Lon-
don, Amsterdam, Paris, and Zurich, and has attracted 44 remote members. The
number of remote members of the Deutsche Brse is predicted to swell to at
least 100 within three to five years. In addition, the Athens Stock Exchange
has installed an electronic trading system that allows members to execute or-
ders via exchange-owned terminals.I14
or by means of a completely automated trading system:
[S]ince 1989, OM Stockholm (formerly the Stockholm Stock Exchange)
has been completely electronic, and has remote members in London, Denmark,
Norway, Finland, and Switzerland. OMLX, the London Securities & Deriva-
tives Exchange, which is owned by the same company as OM Stockholm, is
also a completely electronic trading system. Tradepoint, a London-based
electronic stock exchange, started trading in September 1995. The Paris
Bourse is now an entirely computerized stock market. Supercac, a system
linked to member firms and other intermediaries collecting client orders, went
on line in April 1995 and allows for continuous, automated trade execution to
take place on the Paris Bourse. The purchase by the Toronto Stock Exchange
("TSE") of the Paris Bourse's Supercac software enabled the TSE to close its
floor on April 24, 1997. Other examples of completely automated exchanges
include the MEFF Renta Fija and MEFF Renta Variable in Spain, the New
Zealand Stock Exchange, the Korean Stock Exchange, the Philippine Stock
Exchange, the Singapore Stock Exchange, and the Thailand Stock Ex-change. 175
Foreign exchanges that offer remote access to members located in non-
U.S. jurisdictions generally install proprietary market terminals in the
members' offices by providing data feeds or codes for use with software
operated through the members' computers, or by allowing members to ac-
cess a market's trading facilities through third-party services or public net-
works, such as the Internet.176 Several foreign markets have sought, but not
received, comfort from the Commission to allow them to offer direct trad-
ing services to U.S. persons without violating the registration requirements
for broker-dealers and exchanges.
177
174 Regulation of Exchanges Release, supra note 8, at 168, 169-71 n.216 (citations omit-
ted); see also MARKET 2000 REPORT, supra note 42, at VII-C. Such technology is called an
"automatic order match system with remote access." The first such system was launched by
the Cincinnati Stock Exchange in 1976. See History, Cincinnati Stock Exchange, at
http://www.cincinnatistock.com/history.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2000).
175 Regulation of Exchanges Release, supra note 8, at 169-71 n.216 (citations omitted).
176 See id. at 171.
177 See id. at n.219. The Commodities Futures and Options Trading Commission began
to take a different approach to the registration of foreign exchanges, which permitted foreign
exchanges operating primarily outside the United States an electronic linkage to a U.S. ex-
change without registration. See CFTC, Proposed Rules Concerning Order Routing and
Electronic Access to Futures Exchanges Operating Primarily Outside the United States, Re-
lease No. 4243-99 (Mar. 16, 1999), 64 Fed. Reg. 14159 (Mar. 24, 1999). However, the pro-
posed rule was withdrawn. See 64 Fed. Reg. 32829 (Jun. 18, 1999) (noting that fundamental
issues concerning cross-border transactions first must be resolved).
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A domestic investor directly trading shares of the NASDAQ Ten on
the EASDAQ would not result in NMS transaction reporting because the
EASDAQ is not a market center of the NMS. The NMS reporting require-
ments derive from the duty of an exchange to file a transaction reporting
plan for all transactions in exchange-listed and NASDAQ securities, 178 and
the EASDAQ does not file a reporting plan with the Commission. How-
ever, the Internet Release places in doubt the regulatory status of a foreign
exchange that accepts orders through a Web site. The Internet Release cre-
ates the anomalous situation in which a domestic investor could use a pro-
prietary terminal, telephone or facsimile apparatus to transmit an order to a
foreign exchange without the foreign exchange being registered. However,
if the exchange had a Web site on a server in its home jurisdiction, it could
not accept an order over the Internet without incurring greater risk of being
subject to SEC registration.
(b) Order Flow Through a Foreign Intermediary to a Foreign Market
A foreign broker-dealer need not register with the Commission, if it
does not solicit transactions in securities for U.S. persons or if it solicits
U.S. institutional investors or major U.S. institutional investors under cir-
cumstances specified in Exchange Act Rule 15a-6. 7 9 Because such foreign
broker-dealers are not registered, they are not members of an exchange or a
national association; therefore, they are not required to disseminate trading
data on the NMS pursuant to a transaction reporting plan. 80 Consequently,
a U.S. person simply could telephone or fax a foreign broker-dealer to place
an unsolicited order. The Internet Release places in doubt whether the bro-
178 Exchange Act Rule I 1Aa3-1(b)(1) provides that "[e]very exchange shall file a trans-
action reporting plan regarding transactions in listed equity and NASDAQ securities exe-
cuted through its facilities, and every association shall file a transaction reporting plan
regarding transactions in listed equity and NASDAQ securities executed by its members oth-
erwise than on an exchange." Dissemination of Transaction Reports and Last Sale Data
With Respect to Transactions in Reported Securities, 17 C.F.R. § 240.11 Aa3-1(b)(1) (2000).
,' Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6 (2000). Rule 15a-6 provides, in part, that a "for-
eign broker or dealer shall be exempt from the registration requirements of Sections 15(a)(1)
or 15B(a)(1) of the Act to the extent that the foreign broker or dealer: (1) effects transactions
in securities with or for persons that have not been solicited by the foreign broker or dealer;
or.. .(3) induces or attempts to induce the purchase or sale of any security by a U.S. institu-
tional investor or a major U.S. institutional investor, provided that...." the foreign broker or
dealer abides by the detailed reporting, transactional, record keeping, custodial, and organ-
izational requirements as specified by Rulel5a-6. See Exemption of Certain Foreign Bro-
kers or Dealers, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6 (2000).
180 See Exchange Act Rule I IAa3-1(b)(4), which provides that "[elvery broker or dealer
who is a member of an exchange or association shall promptly transmit to the exchange or
association of which it is a member all information required by any effective transaction re-
porting plan filed by such exchange or association (either individually or jointly with other
exchanges and/or associations)." Dissemination of Transaction Reports and Last Sale Data
With Respect to Transaction in Reported Securities, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1 1Aa3-1(b)(4) (2000).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 21:131 (2000)
ker-dealer with a Web site could receive an unsolicited order over the Inter-
net without the risk of triggering the registration requirements of the federal
securities laws.
(c) Order Flow Through a Domestic Broker-Dealer to Foreign Affiliated or
Unaffiliated Foreign Broker-Dealer
Order flow through a domestic broker-dealer to a foreign broker-dealer
presents significant challenges to the SEC in the realm of market transpar-
ency. The Market 2000 Report found that domestic broker-dealers fre-
quently sent trades by facsimile through a foreign brokerage desk or foreign
affiliate to avoid NMS transparency standards, off-board trading restric-
tions, transaction fees, or limits on short sales. In the so-called "fax mar-
ket," trades were "booked" on the foreign desk, and no NMS reporting
occurred.1 81 Transparency standards in foreign markets are less stringent
than within the NMS; consequently, foreign trades generally are not re-
ported publicly in the United States.182 Rather than the requirement that
trades be reported through ACT within 90 seconds of execution, foreign
transactions in domestic issues may not be reported until the market close
of the next day to the NYSE 18 3 and the NASD184 due to the fact that such
transactions may be executed outside of normal trading hours. The present
exchange rules require the transaction to be reported if it is for the account
of a NYSE or NASDAQ member or a customer of a member.185 Signifi-
cantly, an investor generally can end-run the transaction reporting rules by
making an unsolicited trade through a foreign broker-dealer that is exempt
from registration pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 15a-6 by phone or fax.
(d) Direct or Intermediated Order Flow From a Foreign Investor to a For-
eign Market
Finally, as the case with trading shares of the NASDAQ Ten on the
EASDAQ, there is a strong likelihood that most of the trading will be at-
tributed to foreign investors through foreign broker-dealers. As neither the
181 See MARKET 2000 REPORT, supra note 42, at VII-2.
182 See id.
... See N.Y.S.E. Rule 410B(b), 2 N.Y.S.E Guide (CCH) 2410B(b), at 3704.
4 See NASD Rule 4632(a)(4)(B)(ii), [2000] NASD Manual - The NASD Stock Market
(CCH) 4632(a)(4)(B)(ii), at 5872 (requiring trades executed between 6:30 p.m. and mid-
night Eastern Time in the United States be reported through ACT on the next business day
(T+1)). Between 8:00 a.m. and 6:30 p.m., the NASD operates the ACT automated trade re-
porting system to facilitate trade reporting. See id. at 4632 (a)(4)(B)(i). An NASD mem-
ber that is not a market maker may make last sales reports of transactions in designated
securities on a weekly basis. See id. at 4632(a)(3).
115 See N.Y.S.E. Rule 410B(a), 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2410B(a), at 3704; NASD
Rule 632(a), [2000] NASD Manual-The NASDAQ Stock Market (CCH) 4632(a), at
5871.
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foreign broker-dealer nor the foreign exchange utilizes a "means or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce," the participants and the transaction gen-
erally are outside SEC jurisdiction. 186 Consequently, this trading data will
not be disseminated on the NMS.
(e) Conclusion
Several channels for order flow in domestic securities on foreign ex-
changes do not result in trade reporting on the NMS. Significantly, shares
of issuers that comprise a substantial portion of NMS capitalization will be
traded without the benefit of an environment in which all markets compete,
as the EASDAQ is not an NMS market center. Rather, NMS transaction
reporting is delayed, or is left to arbitrageurs that domestically trade shares
of the EASDAQ Ten. Moreover, the Commission needs to ensure that
these avenues of cross-border order flow do not provide domestic investors
with a way to avoid domestic regulatory requirements or for fraudulent or
manipulative purposes. 7
In the Market 2000 Report, the Staff noted the ease and regularity with
which U.S. securities could be traded in foreign markets or on the trading
desks of foreign broker-dealers in the "fax market."'88 This trading oc-
curred in hundreds of issues and constituted approximately 7 million shares
per day of NYSE volume.189 Most of this trading took place on the London
Stock Exchange shortly before the opening of the NYSE, and involved a
large block or a basket of multiple stocks.' 90 Although current figures are
not available, the eminent demise of NYSE Rule 390,191 the popularity of
the Internet, the proliferation of ATSs and further globalization of the mar-
kets, lead one to expect that such trading has increased dramatically since
release of the Market 2000 Report.
The following Table illustrates the possible varieties of transmission of
order flow from a domestic investor or participant to a foreign market.
Notably, the securities may be issued either by domestic or foreign compa-
nies, and the mode of transmission for order flow in the fax market may be
telephone, facsimile, Internet, or proprietary means of data transmission.
186 See Exchange Act, 15 USC §78j, supra note 160. But see infra note 260 (discussing
the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the SEC).
187 See MARKET 2000 REPORT, supra note 42, at VII-4.
18' See id. at 11-13-14, VII-2.
"89 See id. at 11-14.
'90 See id.
'9' N.Y.S.E. Rule 390 prohibited a member from trading N.Y.S.E. stocks "off the board."
See 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2390, at 3651. At the time of the Market 2000 Report, Rule
390 did not apply to transactions in a foreign market outside of trading hours. The N.Y.S.E.
has applied to the Commission to approve the repeal of Rule 390. See Fragmentation Re-
lease, supra note 134.
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Thus, the term "fax market" has become an anachronism in the six years





1 FOREIGN NMS TRADEMA KET REPO TING









* Domestic Investor BROKER-DEALER
, Foreign Investor
O Foreign Market = Foreign Exchange or ATS
for stocks or options of U.S. companies
- Geopolitical Border
- Phone. Fax, Proprietary or Internet Unkage
* Trading desk of foreign broker-dealer could







m. ANALYSIS OF THE "TARGETING APPROACH"
A. The SEC's Internet Release: The Concept of "Targeting"
The Commission stated explicitly in the Internet Release that, "our in-
vestor protection concerns are best addressed through implementation by
issuers and financial service providers of precautionary measures that are
reasonably designed to ensure that offshore Internet offers are not targeted
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to persons in the United States or to U.S. persons."' 92 The Internet Release
uses the term, "U.S. persons" as it is defined in Exchange Act Rule 902(k)
of Regulation S.193 Pursuant to Rule 902(k), a "U.S. Person" includes: "(i)
[a]ny natural person resident in the United States or "(ii) [a]ny partnership
or corporation organized or incorporated under the laws of the United
States.' 94 In the Commission's view, the term "U.S. Person" is predicated
on residence in the United States, notwithstanding any temporary presence
in a foreign jurisdiction. 195 Therefore, to the problem of securities activity
over the Internet-an inherently non-national medium of communication-
the Commission has embraced an approach that is closely tied to physical
presence in a geographic location. 196 In so doing, the Commission incon-
gruously has superimposed the concept of terrafirma over the ethereal me-
dium of Cyberspace.
B. Adoption of the Targeting Approach by IOSCO
Notably, the IOSCO Internet Report adopted the Targeting Approach.
In the IOSCO Internet Report, IOSCO set forth the following factors that
securities regulators should consider in determining whether to assert regu-
latory authority over an offer of securities or financial services on the Inter-
net.
Factors that may support the assertion of regulatory authority include:
* It is evident that information is targeted to residents of the regula-
tor's jurisdiction.
* The issuer or financial service provider accepts purchases from or
provides services to residents of the regulator's jurisdiction (unless
made pursuant to an exemption or under circumstances that may
exclude a public offering).
192 Internet Release, supra note 7, at 8-9 (emphasis added).
'
93 See id., at n.20. Rule 902(k) of Regulation S is found at 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(k).
'94 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(k) (2000).
195 See Internet Release, supra note 7, at n.20 (citing Securities Act Release No. 7505
(Feb. 18, 1998)).
196 See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the In-
ternational Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 910 (1998) (arguing that
Regulation S "take[s] a primarily territorial approach to jurisdiction."). The Commission has
recently applied the Targeting Approach to cross-border tender offers in the so-called "Rule
801 Proposals." See SEC, Cross-Border Tender and Exchange Offers, Business Combina-
tions and Rights Offerings, Release Nos. 33-7759, 34-42054, IS-1208, 39-2378 (Oct. 26,
1999). The Release applies the Targeting Approach to an offshore bidder that uses a Web
site to publicize an offshore tender or exchange offer, rights offering, or business combina-
tion. The Release requires the bidder to obtain the mailing address or telephone number of
security holders to ensure that posted offering materials are not directly or indirectly ac-
cessed by U.S. persons over the Internet. See id.
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* The issuer or financial service provider uses e-mail or other media
to "push" the information to residents of the regulator's jurisdic-
tion.
Factors that may support a decision not to assert regulatory authority
include:
" The issuer or financial service provider clearly states to whom the
Internet offer is directed, rather than appearing to extend the offer
into any jurisdiction.
" The Web site contains a statement listing those jurisdictions in
which the issuer or financial service provider has been (or has not
been) authorized to offer or sell its securities or services.
" The issuer or financial service provider takes precautions that are
reasonably designed to prevent sales to residents in the regulator's
jurisdiction. 197
These factors make clear that IOSCO has adopted the focus on geopo-
litical boundaries initiated by the securities regulatory body of the United
States.
C. Adoption of the Targeting Approach by Other Securities Regulatory
Bodies
In addition to the Internet Release, the Financial Services Authority,
the securities regulator of the United Kingdom adopted a "targeting" or "di-
recting" approach to its assertion of jurisdiction over securities activity on
the Internet.!"8 Like the Internet Release, the Financial Services Authority
set forth a similar Targeting Approach to consider, in the totality of the cir-
cumstances, whether an offer on the Internet fell under regulation in the
United Kingdom. 99
Commentators have noted correctly that the IOSCO Internet Report
"stands to significantly influence regulations and policies regarding internet
securities activity."200 The Annex to the IOSCO *Internet Report, which
summarized the initiatives of other securities regulators, supports this
proposition.20 1  For example, the Australian Securities and Investment
197 IOSCO Internet Report, supra note 147, at 6.
19 See Financial Services Authority, Treatment of Material on Overseas Internet World
Wide Web Sites Accessible in the United Kingdom but not Intended for Investors in the U.K.
(May 28, 1998). See generally Mann, supra note 70; Michelle C. Wallach & John T. Travis,
Financial Services on the Internet and the U.K. Regulatory Regime, in SECURITIES LAW &
THE INTERNET, supra note 70, at 441.
199 See Michael Mann, et al., Summary Implications of the September 1998 Report of the
Technical Committee of lOSCO Regarding Securities Activity on the Internet, in SECURITIES
LAW & TiE INTERNET, supra note 70, at 423, 425.2
00 Id.
201 See IOSCO Internet Report, supra note 147, Annex; see also Mann, supra note 70, at
431-40 (analyzing IOSCO Internet Report).
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Commission issued Policy Statement Number141: Offers of Securities on
the Internet.20 2 The Policy Statement notes that the Australian Commission
does not intend to regulate Internet offers that are not targeted at persons in
Australia, but that it will consider other factors, such as disclaimers or lack
of other misconduct when considering whether an Internet-based offer
should be registered.
The Canadian Securities Administrations2 °3 took a similar approach,
stating that a Web posting that offers securities qualifies as trading securi-
ties in a Canadian jurisdiction, unless the posting has a prominent dis-
claimer, and the cyber-offeror takes reasonable precautions to ensure that it
is not engaging in a securities transaction with Canadian residents.
204
In Germany, the Bundesaufsichtsamtflir den Wertpapierhandel (Ger-
man Federal Supervisory Office for Securities Trading) treats an offer over
the Internet as a public offer in Germany, if either German investors ex-
pressly are targeted by the offer or if German investors are not excluded ex-
pressly from the offer.2 °5 In either event, the offeror must file a prospectus
with the Supervisory Office. The Supervisory Office stated that it was con-
cemed that investors without access to the Internet also should have access
to e-offers. The Supervisory Office further stated that an Internet-based of-
fering must contain disclaimers in the German language and must ensure
that no German residents respond to the offer to remain exempt from the
registration requirements. Finally, the Supervisory Office stated that it is
increasing its enforcement activities against those who do not comply with
its Internet policy.
In contrast to these regulatory bodies, the Corporate Finance Commit-
tee of Singapore has focused not on the Targeting Approach, but on making
Singapore an international financial center. On October 28, 1998, it issued
The Securities Markets Final Recommendations, which emphasized ex-
202 See Australian Securities and Investment Commission, Policy Statement Number 141:
Offers of Securities on the Internet (Feb. 3, 2000), at http://www.cpd.comlau/asic/ps/asicps.
htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2000).
203 The Canadian Securities Administrations includes: the Alberta Securities Commis-
sion; British Columbia Securities Commission; Manitoba Securities Commission; Office of
the Administrator, New Brunswick; Securities Commission of Newfoundland; Registrar of
Securities, Northwest Territories; Nova Scotia Securities Commission; Ontario Securities
Commission, Registrar of Securities, Prince Edward Island; Commission des valeurs mo-
bili~res du Qu6bec; Saskatchewan Securities Commission, and the Registrar of Securities,
Government of the Yukon. See Canadian Securities Authorities, National & Multilateral
Policies: National Instrument 14-101, at http://albertasecurities.con/policies/nat.multipo
l.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2000).
204 See Canadian Securities Authorities, National & Multilateral Policies: Trading Secu-
rities Using The Internet And Other Electronic Means, No. 47-201, at http://albertasecurities.
com/policies/nat multipol.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2000).
20
1 See Jahresbericht 1998 (Annual Report 1998), at http://www.bawer.de/jahresbe.htm
(last visited Apr. 5, 2000). This document can be downloaded in German. See id. (Offentli-
che Angebote iber das Internet" (Offerings over the Internet)).
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panding use of the Internet to distribute information such as prospectuses,
annual reports, and corporate announcements. °6 The Final Recommenda-
tions emphasized that the current law should be modified to authorize the
Internet as a sufficient method of distribution for these documents. Moreo-
ver, it recommended that issuers establish Web sites to make available such
information to investors, and that shareholders have permission to attend
shareholder meetings and vote via the Internet. The Corporate Finance
Committee noted the substantial cost reductions in conducting such activi-
ties over the Internet.
D. Implications for a Global Securities Market of the Targeting Approach
The Targeting Approach presents problems when viewed from a global
perspective. This perspective recognizes that advances in technology al-
ready have created a global market in securities and related services that
transcends geopolitical borders, and that issuers have not exercised fully
their discretion to determine the market or country in which their shares are
traded. This perspective further recognizes the objectives of investor pro-
tection, market transparency and competition, and efficiency (admittedly,
frequently conflicting goals), while considering vast global asymmetries re-
garding distribution of market capitalization and relative stringency of dis-
closure and regulatory regimes.
1. Dangerous Territoriality: Regulation S and the Restriction to
"U.S. Persons"
The primary difficulty with the Targeting Approach is that it runs
counter to incentivizing efficient, low-cost markets. One would expect in-
vestors to utilize the most efficient securities markets due to the low com-
munications costs of the Internet. The Targeting Approach, however,
restricts low-cost/high-efficiency markets from accepting orders over the
Internet from foreign jurisdictions in which they are not registered. Notably
absent from the IOSCO Internet Report is the adoption of the Targeting
Approach by securities regulators from developing markets, the countries
that comprise the majority of global population,20 f and whose populations
could benefit from the accessibility and low cost of the Internet. If all
countries adopted the Targeting Approach (and they seem to be following
this trend), U.S.-based exchanges would be forced to register with regula-
tory bodies from Armenia to Zaire if they did not make adequate efforts to
206 See Mann, supra note 70, at 439.
207 In 1997, low and middle-income countries had an average GNP per capita of
US$1,250 versus high-income countries of US$25,890. Low and middle-income countries
comprise 84.1% of global population. See THE WORLD BANK, 1999 Economic Indicators, at
http://www.worldbank.orglwdr/2000/fullreport.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2000).
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prevent foreign residents from utilizing the Internet for transmission of or-
der flow.2°8
This concern is significant in light of the findings in Section II(B)(1)
supra of the dominant position of U.S. exchanges in global equity market
capitalization and of a global trading environment marked by increasing
cross-border transactions. Certainly, if the Internet creates a global menu of
securities markets, it may well be that investors should be permitted broad
access to the most efficient markets. However, the Targeting Approach
places a distorted registration onus on U.S.-based exchanges because those
markets have the largest relative capitalization and greater relative transpar-
ency, efficiency, and disclosure. These are the very markets that investors
would be expected to access via the Internet due to its low communications
costs.
2. Regulatory Uncertainty and Free-riding the Strict U.S. Disclosure Re-
gime
Because the Targeting Approach creates a very narrow safe harbor,
foreign exchanges that conduct limited Internet transactions with U.S per-
sons risk subjecting themselves to the registration requirements of the Ex-
change Act. The Regulation of Exchanges Release, moreover, raises more
questions than it provides regulatory guidance to foreign exchanges that
give direct trading access to U.S. persons. The Commission's lack of
regulatory guidance on this matter has discouraged the offer of foreign
market access to U.S. persons; furthermore, foreign markets have been re-
luctant to permit U.S. persons to become members of their markets without
assurances from the Commission that they would not be required to register
as an exchange.209 As a consequence, U.S. persons may be deprived of the
opportunities to access these foreign markets, which provide beneficial di-
versification effects.2t0
208 The title of this essay derives from the territorial focus of the Targeting Approach, al-
though the implications of the Targeting Approach have international consequences as do
other aspects of domestic securities law. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The
Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American Securities Law, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 207
(1996). But see Bevis Longstreth, A Look at the SEC's Adaptation to Global Market Pres-
sure, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 319 (1995) (arguing the SEC's regulatory approach has
sought to limit the extraterritorial effects of domestic regulation).
209 See Regulation of Exchanges Release, supra note 8, at 173; see also SEC, Response
Letter from Deutsche Bdrse to Commission on Regulation of Exchanges Release 26 (Oct. 3,
1997) ("The past unwillingness of foreign exchanges and other markets to apply for limited
volume exemptions under Section 5 of the Exchange Act further indicates that such proce-
dural limitations, even with the Commission's broader exemptive power with respect to the
substantive application of the provisions of the Exchange Act, would likely impose prohibi-
tive costs and excessive delays in providing U.S. investors with access to trading on their fa-
cilities.").
2 10 See EDwIN J. ELTON & MARTIN J. GRUBER, MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY AND
INVESTMENT ANALYSIS 274 (5
th ed. 1995) (concluding that the correlation between indices of
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The Targeting Approach produces a related externality: regulatory
free-riding. Under the current system, exchanges of countries with lax
regulatory regimes can free-ride off the strict SEC-mandated disclosure and
the price discovery generated by the primary markets in the NMS. The
market centers of the NMS create value through their rules, operations, and
surveillance which, in turn, create large and liquid markets.2 11 Conse-
quently, the market centers of the NMS produce efficient price discovery in
the NASDAQ Ten, which the EASDAQ traders then use at no cost.
Regulatory free-riding produces an externality for issuers that choose
to list on an NMS market center, rather than a foreign market that operates
under a less strict regulatory regime. In return for access to the large U.S.
capital markets for funding, these issuers have undergone the expense of a
strict disclosure regime, accounting pursuant to Generally Accepted Ac-
counting Principles (rather than International Accounting Standards), and
quarterly (rather than semi-annual) reporting. Nevertheless, unsolicited
listing on foreign markets fragments order flow for their shares. This frag-
mentation prevents competing orders from interacting with each other,
thereby lowering the liquidity of the issue. As a result, price discovery of
the issuers' shares loses efficiency. Therefore, one would expect fragmen-
tation to increase the cost of capital for the issuer because pricing ineffi-
ciency constitutes a risk factor that impacts the expected future value of the
issue.
212
different countries is lower than the average correlation coefficient between two U.S. equi-
ties.); Bruno H. Solnik, Why Not Diversify Internationally Rather Than Domestically?, FIN.
ANALYsTs J., Jul.-Aug. 1974, at 48 (showing average variability of an internationally diver-
sified portfolio to be less than half the variability of a domestically diversified portfolio);
Kenneth R. French & James M. Porterba, Investor Diversification and International Equity
Markets, 81 AM. ECON. Rnv. 223 (May 1991) (arguing that "home country" bias in portfo-
lio diversification reduces investment returns). See generally William F. Sharpe, A Simpli-
fied Model of Portfolio Analysis, 9 MGMT. Sci. 227 (1963) (explanation of risk reduction
through diversification)
211 Price discovery has measurable value, as supported by the revenues that major market
centers obtain from vending price information. In 1998, N.Y.S.E.'s share of CTA revenue
was $111.5 million (15.3 percent of total revenues). See Keeping Apace of Cyberspace, su-
pra note 146, at 54. The NASD's market data revenues from Nasdaq were $128.5 million
(17.4 percent of total revenues). See id.; see also Mahoney, supra note 12, at 1480 ("The
physical facility, moreover, may not be the most important asset comprising the market.
Markets generate valuable information in the form of prices and unless it is possible for the
members to limit access to price information, non-members may free-ride on the prices re-
ducing their own search costs."); J. Harold Mullherin et al., Prices Are Property: The Or-
ganization of Financial Exchanges From a Transaction Cost Perspective, 34 J.L. & ECON.
591, 630-34 (1991).
212 See Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread, 17 J.
FIN. 223, 223-49 (1986).
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3. Global Market Fragmentation and Transparency
Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel succinctly stated the truism
that the whole concept underlying an efficient market rests the concentra-
tion of order flow:
Organized exchanges reduce the costs of transacting. By making it easier for
parties with different beliefs about the future to transact, organized exchanges
increase liquidity and reduce the unnecessary risk of investing. The greater li-
quidity of the secondary market, the more successful the exchange.213
As discussed in Section 1(A) supra, the dual objectives of consolida-
tion of order flow and competition among multiple markets inherently are
contradictory. The problem with the Targeting Approach from a global
perspective is that it creates separate markets based on geopolitical bounda-
ries, but it cannot follow through with quotation or transaction reporting re-
quirements similar to the NMS. In other words, the Targeting Approach
does not promote competition among orders on a global level despite the
globalization of markets.
Moreover, the issues of order fragmentation, POF and transparency set
forth in the Survey of ongoing issues connected with the NMS,214 become
exacerbated when viewed from the global perspective. Consider again, the
trading of shares in a NASDAQ Ten issuer on the EASDAQ. Trades that
U.S. broker-dealers do not intermediate are not reported at all to the NMS.
The foreign broker may internalize an order for shares of a NASDAQ Ten
issuer, route the order to the EASDAQ, or perhaps to another foreign ex-
change or foreign ATS that provides POF to the broker. Moreover, the ex-
istence of the POF may never be disclosed to the investor. Finally,
reporting of the trade will not take place in accordance with the standards of
the NMS, but by the less transparent standards of the European Union.2
15 If
no NMS transaction report is made, transparency will take place only to the
degree that domestic trading by arbitrageurs indicate that the trade was
"out of the market." Although there exists debate and inconclusive data
about fragmentation, POF, and transparency within the NMS, this example
establishes clearly the troublesome nature of the current global trading envi-
ronment.
2 13 See Frank H. Easterbrook & David R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protec-
tion of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 689 (1984) (citing Tesler, Why There Are Organized
Futures Markets, 24 J.L. ECON. 1 (1981)).
214 See supra Section II A 6.
215 See MARKET 2000 REPORT, supra note 42, at VII-2.
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IV. SUPPLEMENTAL APPROACH: UTILIZATION OF CODE-BASED
REGULATION AND THE INTEGRATED GLOBAL MARKET
SYSTEM
A. History of a Unified Market Approach
Shortly after passage of the 1975 Amendments, Professors Mendelson
and Peake and R.T Williams proposed the PMW System to the National
Market Advisory Board, the body Congress charged to design the NMS.216
The proposed PMW System would operate on the trading platform of a sin-
gle auction market per issue, an approach that would have encouraged com-
petitive market-making and execution of matching customer orders without
the necessity of dealer intervention.217 In the PMW System, all order flow
would be centralized and trade reporting would simply exist as a by-product
of the trading system. Therefore, the PMW System would consolidate all
the existing systems of quotation dissemination, execution information, and
trade reporting into a single system. Other attributes of the proposed PMW
System were that it would have cost relatively little to build, it would have
provided a comprehensive audit trail of trading information for regulatory
purposes, and would have provided investors with the greatest supply and
demand information at all times. Finally, because price parameters auto-
matically triggered an execution, the trading system captured all required
trading information. The system then could relay the information back to
an investor's brokerage house for clearing and settlement. Because such a
system did not rely upon manual transcription, there was practically no pos-
sibility of transcription errors. At the time of the proposed PMW System,
Toronto's Computer Automated Trading System and the Cincinnati Stock
Exchange operated similar trading systems. History tells us that the PMW
System was not adopted.
At the time of the Market 2000 Report, a group of commentators rec-
ommended again that the Commission adopt the "single market ap-
proach.' '218 Pursuant to the single market approach, the Commission would
create a single market with identical rules applicable to all participants, in-
vestors, and orders. An order would interact in a single automated order-
match system.219 The Staff rejected this proposal, preferring "discrete, in-
cremental market improvements, facilitating fair market competition, and
promoting full disclosure. 2 In assessing the Market 2000 Report, Profes-
sors Mendelson and Peake revisited the PMW System and noted the Staffs
rejection of the single market approach, stating that U.S. equity markets
216 See Mendelson & Peake, supra note 27, at 464-65.
217 See id. at 465.
21
9 See MARKEr 2000 REPORT, supra note 42, at VII-B.
219 See Mendelson & Peake, supra note 27, at 465.
220 MARKET 2000 REPORT, supra note 42, at III-D.
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must remain readily available to foreign investors at low cost.221 Invoking
national interests, they recommended that the "solution to the flight of stock
trading from our shores is for the Commission to enact rules which encour-
age the development of electronic markets. This would enhance U.S. com-
petitiveness greatly and encourage foreign investors to use American
market centers."
222
Over the years, other commentators have called for unification of vari-
ous regulatory aspects of the NMS and also of global securities markets.
One commentator has recommended that "market centers could create
trading mechanisms but leave surveillance and discipline of their members
or users to a single overarching national body, either the SEC or an SEC-
monitored professional association of broker/dealers (NASD perhaps)."
223
In 1991, another proposal for the single regulatory approach stated that "[a]
single regulatory organization is needed to oversee the trading of securities
on the international market. This body would work to harmonize existing
rules and mandate new regulations to better protect investors all over the
world., 224 In 1998, a similar approach to the problem of globalized securi-
ties markets, the "Global Coordinator," was proposed.225 The Global Coor-
dinator was described as an international regulatory body that would
harmonize disclosure rules through the cooperation of domestic securities
regulators, and would monitor domestic securities regulators' implementa-
tion, interpretation, and enforcement of the unified standards, which would
bind member countries.226 The "leading candidate" to serve as Global Co-
ordinator, according to the Commentator, was IOSCO.
227
Most recently, the Commission's Fragmentation Release gave the pub-
lic the opportunity to comment on issues related to market fragmentation.22
The Commission sought comment on six proposed approaches. The last
proposed approach was the "most controversial," 229 but most relevant to this
221 See Mendelson & Peake, supra note 27, at 470.
2 id.
223 Oesterle, supra note 13, at 507.
224 Solomon & Corso, supra note II, at 338.
= See Ui Geiger, Harmonization of Securities Disclosure Rules in the Global Market -
A Proposal, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1800-1805 (1998).
226 see id.
227 See id. at 1800 n.83.
228 See generally Fragmentation Release, supra note 134.
229 See Michael Schroeder, SEC to Study Plan to Link Exchanges for Better Trades,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2000, at C19. The other five possible options for addressing market
fragmentation are: (a) requiring greater disclosure by market centers and brokers concerning
trade executions and order routing; (b) restricting order internalization and POF; (c)
requiring that market orders be exposed to price competition; (d) prohibiting market makers
from "trading ahead" of previously displayed and accessible limit orders; and (e) providing
intermarket time priority for limit orders or quotations that improve the NBBO. See
Fragmentation Release, supra note 134, at § IV.C.2.
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essay. The proposal called for the establishment of a national market link-
age system ("NLS") as one alternative approach that would provide
price/time priority for all displayed trading interest. The NLS would dis-
play all orders and quotations to all market participants and the public in a
fully transparent fashion. Under the NLS proposal, market makers could
execute a transaction as principal only in the event that the execution re-
sulted in price improvement. Although the NLS would automatically ex-
pose trading interest, the NLS would not serve as a market center; rather,
execution would occur at a market center. The NLS proposal, however,
does not even attempt to remedy the market fragmentation that exists on a
global basis.
B. Description of the Integrated Global Market System
This essay proposes a solution to the problem of globalized securities
markets in cyberspace that is more modest than creation of a Global Coor-
dinator, but more expansive in scope than the NLS. Simply, this essay
takes the position that the SEC should consider a "code-based approach" to
the issue of global market fragmentation. Certainly, the Commission can-
not dictate the architecture of an Internet-based global securities market.
However, the Commission can consider proposals from a consortium of
global market participants for the creation of such a market, and it can de-
termine whether the architecture of the proposed exchange meets the stan-
dards of the federal securities laws. The SEC should use a code-oriented
approach to regulation of market structure, an approach that promotes the
primary policy objectives of the federal securities laws: investor protection
and the facilitation of capital formation.2 °
One way to implement a code-based approach would be for the SEC to
consider applications for the registration of an "integrated global securities
market" ("IGSM"). An IGSM would serve as an exchange, with character-
istics including integrated systems of disclosure, self-regulation, dispute
resolution, and clearing and settlement, that would operate on a global ba-
sis. The trading system should operate on the platform of an automated or-
der-match system with remote access for intermediaries and investors.231
230 See Frankel, supra note 169, at 1324 n.16; see also H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at
31 (1995), reprinted in Act of Nov. 28, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
730 (stating that the objectives of the federal securities laws are "to protect investors and to
maintain confidence in the securities markets" to "benefit national savings, capital formation
and investment"). Contra Merrit B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market:
Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. Rav. 2498, 2609 (1997) ("The traditional SEC
goal of investor protection and its more recently articulated goal of market protection are
both misguided.").
231 Without entering the debate over the order-driven versus dealer-driven markets (see
generally Pagano & Roell, supra note 122; Madhavan, supra note 122), it initially appears
that an order-driven market may provide a better platform for an IGSM because it provides
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Under this proposal, an IGSM would apply to the SEC for registration. Be-
fore granting a registration, the SEC would consider the same host of issues
as it does when any applicant seeks registration as an exchange, 2  but
would also consider systems architecture that would enable the exchange to
operate transnationally using a communications medium such as, but not
necessarily limited to, the Internet. In adopting this approach, the Commis-
sion should not follow the Targeting Approach or focus on the geographic
location of the issuers, participants, and investors. Rather, the Commission
should consider whether the IGSM meets the functional requirements of the
federal securities laws. As such, the issuers, participants, and investors
connected with the IGSM could be from any country. Moreover, the floor-
less trading system theoretically could exist in any country, although it
could be expected that an IGSM would have one less hurdle toward regis-
tration if the trading system was physically located in the United States,
rather than in a country that grants access to the Commission as if the trad-
ing system were located in the United States.
With respect to disclosure of listed issues, an IGSM should seek ap-
proval from the SEC for home country levels of disclosure. This concept is
not novel. The SEC has permitted home country disclosure for issuers
listed on the Pink Sheets since 1983.23  Section 12(g)(1)(B) of the Ex-
change Act requires quarterly reporting by issuers whose shares are traded
in the United States that have total assets of $1 million and a class of equity
securities held of record by 500 or more persons.234 Section 12g3-2(b)(1)
provides that securities of a foreign private issuer are exempt from the re-
quirements of 12(g) if the class has fewer than 300 holders resident in the
United States or the issuer has filed with the Commission the information
that it is required to make public pursuant to the law of the country of
domicile or the country in which it is incorporated or organized ("home
country disclosure").235 However, the exemption is not available for secu-
for remote access by global investors without the need to regulate the operation of market
makers which may be located in different countries. In any event,
[t]here is little technological justification for retaining the current exchange method of matching
buyers and sellers-a method based on the interaction of individuals in an auction market on an ex-
change floor. Despite some practical problems of implementation, the matching function is well
suited to computerization, and it is likely that automation would in the long run reduce transaction
costs.
Langevoort, supra note 11, at 755.
2 See Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (2000) (setting forth standards for granting
registration to an exchange).
2a3 The "Pink Sheets," published twice daily by the National Quotation Bureau and Over
the Counter Bulletin Board Service, provide the bid/ask information of OTC stocks not
traded on the NASDAQ. The Pink Sheets provide the names and telephone numbers of the
market makers of quoted securities.
234 See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1)(B).
25 See General Rules & Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. §
240.12g3-2(b)(1) (2000).
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rities "quoted in an automated inter-dealer quotation system" or securities
represented by American Depository Receipt after October 5, 1983.236
Home country disclosure comports with the idea of a transnational
stock exchange. In fact, an IGSM would be a good replacement for the
Pink Sheets. Transparency and liquidity on the Pink Sheets are very poor,
and bid/ask spreads are eight to ten times larger than those on market cen-
ters.237 An IGSM should be granted an exemption from the requirement of
Section 12g3-2 of the Exchange Act that securities using home country dis-
closure not be quoted on an "automated inter-dealer quotation system." As
a result, investors would receive protections, such as better execution and
surveillance afforded by an automated system superior to the Pink Sheets.
The disclosure system on the IGSM would provide more investor pro-
tection than the existing global market system provides. Unlike unsolicited
orders to a foreign broker-dealer, which is exempt from registration with the
Commission pursuant to Section 15a-6, a retail investor could access infor-
mation about the risks attendant to trading on the IGSM before placing an
order by clicking on a hyperlink. A central database, accessible over the
Internet and monitored for fraudulent statements and omissions, could
maintain disclosure concerning all issuers listed on the IGSM. Further, the
IGSM could sponsor officially-sanctioned "chat rooms" monitored for
fraudulent statements and stock hyping. Once described this way, the
IGSM emerges as a safe alternative to the Pink Sheets and the present open
Internet environment in which information and "chat" about issues does not
exist on a centralized system subject to market surveillance.
With regard to security, the design of Internet architecture for partici-
pants and investors would have to satisfy the SEC for soundness. Section
1(C) supra established that order flow was transmitted from investors to
NMS intermediaries over the Internet at a rate of one-half million trades
daily, and comprised approximately 16% of all equity trades during the first
quarter of 1999. Certainly, these findings substantiate the proposition that
sufficient encryption technology exists to support an IGSM.23 The chal-
236 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(d)(3)(i).
237 The Pink Sheets suffer from a severe lack of transparency, as they do not provide real-
time quotes, volume reporting, or last-sale reporting. See Franklin R. Edwards, Listing of
Foreign Securities on US. Exchanges, in MODERNIZING U.S. SECURITIES REGULATION:
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 53, 62 (Kenneth Lehn & Robert W. Ram-
phuis eds., 1992). For a description of large bid/ask spreads on the Pink Sheets, see William
H. Donaldson, Contemporary Equity Markets, in GLOBAL EQUITY MARKETS: TECHNOLOGY,
COMPETITION AND REGUALTORY CHANGES (Robert A. Schwartz ed., 1995).
238 Encryption is "an enabling technology that provides companies, their business part-
ners, customers and end users with the ability to get information and service they need much
faster and securely." Laura Didio, Internet Boosts Cryptography, COMPUTERWORLD, Mar.
16 1998, at 32 (quoting Michael Baum, chairperson of the Information and Security Com-
mittee of the American Bar Association). See generally F. Lynn McNulty, Encryption's Im-
portance to Economic And Infrastructure Security, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 427 (1999).
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lenge facing an IGSM is to extend the same level of security that exists for
the transmission of orders from the investor to the broker-dealer to the
transmission of orders from an investor or broker-dealer to the trading sys-
tem.
On the matter of dispute resolution, the IGSM issuers, investors, and
participants would have to execute international arbitration agreements.
Arbitrating disputes concerning securities transactions has remained a long-
standing practice in the United States.239 It also has been the practice in in-
ternational transactions to name a neutral arbitrator for the resolution of
commercial disputes.240 International arbitration agreements would serve to
ameliorate the Commission's concerns over difficulties with foreign court
systems not providing effective investor protection.24'
The IGSM would have to show that it could function as though all
members, issuers, and investors could be regulated from the United States.
For example, the trading system and trading records of the exchange would
either have to be maintained in the United States or be as accessible to the
SEC's staff as though they were. In the latter case, the trading system and
records would have to be maintained in a country that has an outstanding
memorandum of understanding ("MOU") with the SEC that ensured regu-
latory supervision.242 The same showing would have to be made with re-
spect to the individuals and entities that control and participate in the
IGSM.
The existing infrastructure could effectuate clearance and settlement on
the IGSM, or down to the level of the beneficial owner by means of a spe-
cialized depository. In other words, each investor could have an account in
the depository of the IGSM. Securities could not be held in "street
The use of encryption technology is quite widespread. In April 1998, for example, there
were over 300 million copies of encryption products in the commercial marketplace made by
a leading domestic producer of such products, Rivest-Shamir-Adleman. See id. at 428.
Moreover, 29 other countries produce 656 encryption products for sale on the world market
that are of similar strength to domestic products. See id.
239 Arbitration of domestic disputes involving securities transactions has been practiced
since its approval in American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).240 See generally Philippe Fouchard et al., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCLAL ARBrrRATION
(Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999).
241 Regulation of Exchanges Release, supra note 8, at 174.
242 See generally Michael D. Mann et al., International Agreements and Understandings
for the Production of Information and Other Mutual Assistance, 29 INT'L LAw 780 (1995);
Caroline A.A. Greene, International Securities Law Enforcement: Recent Advances in As-
sistance and Cooperation, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 635 (1994); Michael D. Mann et al.,
The Establishment of International Mechanisms for Enforcing Provisional Orders and Final
Judgements Arising from Securities Law Violations, 55-ATrr LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 303
(1992); Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look
Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 250-57 (1990); Paul G. Mahoney, Secu-
rities Regulation by Enforcement: An International Perspective, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 305
(1990).
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name"-the name of the investor's broker-dealer-as is done in the United
States. This method of clearance and settlement remains common in de-
positories outside of the United States in countries including Croatia, India,
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka.243 Such a design prevents investors
from establishing nominee accounts and then acting as de facto market
makers from a jurisdiction that has not effectuated a MOU with the Com-
mission.
Certain provisos accompany this proposal. First, the SEC should reg-
ister any number of IGSMs that meet regulatory standards. If there were
only one such system, innovation would suffer due to lack of competition.
Second, central to the recommendation of this essay is that issuers would be
given the option of having their shares traded on a single market, rather
than having their shares traded on any number of markets without their con-
sent. Third, once a stock is listed on an IGSM, it should not be traded on
another market that does not consolidate all orders in a price/time priority
book with the IGSM. Otherwise, the efficiencies gained by order flow con-
solidation would be lost by fragmentation similar to that within the NMS.
C. Benefits of the Code-Based IGSM Approach
1. An Optimal Approach Through Regulatory Competition
The notion of an IGSM is supported by several economic theories of
securities markets. For example, Professor Mahoney argues that a market
has incentives to create optimal rules.2' He argues that if the SEC did not
require the use of GAAP, the NYSE might enact a lower standard of ac-
counting requirements. However, this lower standard likely would work
more efficiently than the SEC's current regulation of the property rights that
the NYSE has in its listings rules.245 This proposal permits an IGSM to as-
243 See Ruckrich, supra note 171. In Japan and France, clearing for futures and options
trading takes place within the exchange. See SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note , at 15-8. As
an alternative approach, the IGSM could utilize the existing clearance and settlement infra-
structure. The National Securities Clearing Corp. ("NSCC") processes 99% of all equity
trades in the United States. See id. at 16-11. Several foreign clearing houses are currently
linked with the International Securities Clearing Corp., a subsidiary of NSCC. The Interna-
tional Securities Clearing Corp. has links with the International Stock Exchange (London),
CEDEL (Luxembourg, which is linked to twenty depositories and custodians in Europe and
Asia), the Japan Securities Clearing Corp. (Tokyo Stock Exchange), the Central Depository
of the Stock Exchange of Singapore, and the Canadian Depository of Securities (Toronto).
See id. at 15-13. The dominant foreign clearing houses, Cedel (presently, "Clearstream")
and Euroclear, were granted exemption from the registration requirements of the Exchange
Act by the SEC. See id. at 15-46 to 15-47.244 See Mahoney, supra note 12, at 1497.
245 See id. The listing requirements adopted need not be lower than those of the host
country. Der Neuer Markt (a subsidiary of Deutsche B6rse Group) is an example of a new
exchange that raised the disclosure regulations of the host country. Der Neuer Markt raised
disclosure standards by requiring issuers to make quarterly reports in accordance with GAAP
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sess home country disclosure standards from multiple jurisdictions and to
adopt the listing requirements that it determines to be optimal. The cen-
tralized price/time priority order book of the IGSM, moreover, prevents the
regulatory free-rider externality that is illustrated by the NASDAQ Ten be-
ing traded on an ancillary market such as the EASDAQ.
The IGSM proposal comports with the theory of regulatory competi-
tion. The IGSM would place the regulatory regimes of the issuers' home
countries into direct competition. The theory of regulatory competition
provides that regulators compete on a state as well as international level to
produce efficient regulatory requirements.2" In theory, regulatory compe-
tition produces this effect, because regulators have incentives for issuers to
247organize in their jurisdiction for reasons such as revenue or employment.
The IGSM proposal need not enter the debate over whether regulatory
competition creates a race to the top or the bottom, 248 or whether the prem-
ise is even correct that various securities regulatory bodies compete with
each other.249 If securities regulators compete on an international level, the
IGSM promotes regulatory competition by placing issuers in the same mar-
ket with equal standards for execution, transparency, and surveillance.
Consequently, the relative efficiencies of the issuers' home country disclo-
sure standards become apparent in high relief. If regulators do not compete,
then this attribute of the IGSM creates a level platform on which investors
can account for the various relative efficiencies of home country disclosure
requirements in pricing.
2. Use of the Internet to Expand the Efficient Digital Frontier
Professors Gilson and Kraakman in The Mechanisms of Market Effi-
ciency, presented another theory supporting an IGSM.250 The IGSM pro-
in German and in English. See Announcements, Neuer Markt, at http://www.neuer.markt.de/
INTERNETINMI/homeindexe.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2000).
246 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1435, 1507-08 (1992); Roberta
Romano, Competition for Corporate Charters and the Lessons of Takeover Statutes, 61
FORDHAM L. REv. 843 (1993).
247 See Uri Geiger, The Case For Harmonization of Securities Disclosure Rules in the
Global Market, 1997 COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 241,290.
248 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to
Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLuM. L. Rv. 1168, 1168 n.12 (1999). Compare
Choi & Guzman, supra note 196 (arguing for regulatory competition), with Fox, supra note
230 (arguing against regulatory competition).
249 See Geiger, supra note 247, at 290-94. But see Longstreth, supra note 208, at 334
("Yet the United States is virtually alone in traditionally debating regulatory, tax, and other
conditions affecting the financial services industry with little reference to the potential con-
sequences they hold for the industry's ability to compete internationally.").
250 See Ronald . Gilson & Renier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
70 VA. L. Rv. 549 (1984).
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posal comports with transacting securities over the Internet because the
Internet produces low informational and transactional costs for trading eq-
uities, and if "capital market efficiency is a function of information costs,
then economizing on information costs pushes the capital market in the di-
rection of greater efficiency.,' 25 To take this theory one step further, as
Professor Coffee noted, "[t]he costs of acquiring and processing informa-
tion has long been recognized as one of the constraints that determine the
boundaries of the efficient market., 252 The proposed IGSM utilizes the vast
global network of the Internet to consolidate as many orders for transactions
as possible. It accomplishes this task at a very low informational and trans-
actional cost so that geopolitical borders do not constrain the efficient
boundaries of the market.
In contrast, the territorial approach that the various national securities
regulators utilize serves to fragment global order flow by restricting the
source of orders over the Internet to those countries in which an exchange
or intermediary is registered.
3. Use of Code-Based Regulation to Implement Real-Space Values of Secu-
rities Regulation in Cyberspace
There has been an extraordinary rise in Internet-related securities
frauds. 53 One of the attributes of the IGSM is that its architecture can be
"closed" to a degree that is optimal for efficiency, as well as investor pro-
tection and confidence in the market. One can design the architecture of an
IGSM to consolidate for the regulator comprehensive information about an
issuer and all trades in its shares. For example, an IGSM would have the
capability to maintain in a single data base all of the disclosure made by an
issuer, information disclosed during electronic road shows ("e-road
shows"), all records of transactions in the issuer, and all solicitations of in-
vestors by IGSM members to purchase shares of the issuer. 4 Access codes
and encryption would restrict access to this information.
For example, a system of regulation by code could be established
whereby access to information concerning an issuer that is traditionally
"public information," such as prospectuses and periodic financial reports,
25' Id. at 597.
252 Coffee, supra note 68, at 1198.
253 See generally Michael A. Sussman, The Critical Challenges From International High-
Tech and Computer-Related Crime at the Millenium, 9 DuKE L.J. 451 (1999); SEC, Internet
Sweep Media Packet, Release No. 98-117 (October 28, 1998) [hereinafter Internet Sweep
Media Packet], reprinted in 2 SECURITIES LAW & THE INTERNET, supra note 70, at 439; SEC,
SEC Continues Internet Fraud Crackdown, Release No. 99-24 (Feb. 25, 1999) [hereinafter
Internet Fraud Crackdown], reprinted in 2 SEcuRITrEs LAW & THE INTERNET, supra note 70,
at 487; Hunt, supra note 146.
2 This information is presently available to the SEC, but it is not compiled in a compre-
hensive fashion. See Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3to 17a-4.
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would be completely "open." Anyone with the ability to log onto the Web
could acquire the information. Potential members of an underwriting syn-
dicate would have exclusive access to data underlying e-road shows. Ac-
cess to traditionally non-public information would be encrypted and the
access code to it would be carefully protected. Access to a chat room con-
cerning an issuer could be limited to the degree that promotes accountabil-
ity among those who post to it.
In contrast to the IGSM Approach, many of the securities frauds per-
petrated over the Internet involve solicitations made by in the "open" fora
of the Internet chat rooms. "Regulators have expressed concern about the
vulnerability and potential for fraud on the Internet stock discussion boards,
,,255where it is easy to post false information to a wide audience. Those ac-
cused by the SEC of manipulating stocks via Internet "chat rooms" range
from a fifteen-year-old to a tree trimmer to a third-year law student.
6
Certainly, investors always will be subject to such solicitations. However,
IGSM access could be closed to the degree that investor solicitations and
chat rooms are consolidated under the auspices of the IGSM-sanctioned
data base that was subject to surveillance. In such a way, the IGSM can be
designed to further the fundamental objectives of investor protection and
confidence in the market. Thus, the IGSM proposal seeks to implement
Professor Lessig's thesis that "if we decide to preserve values from real
space, we need to think about how."
257
The IGSM reduces, but does not eliminate, several enforcement issues
presented by the Targeting Approach. This reduction results because the
IGSM would use systems architecture to meet investor needs for an Inter-
net-based exchange. Without a regulated exchange to fill this need, the
technology exists for an unregulated exchange to fill this void. Professor
Coffee provided a hypothetical example that illustrates why the IGSM pro-
posal may be more forward-thinking than the Targeting Approach .25  He
hypothesized that an entrepreneur in Central Europe or Southeast Asia be-
gan making a market in some foreign stocks, and perhaps some well-known
U.S. equities. This entrepreneur has no assets in the United States and does
255 John Emshwiller, SEC's Lawsuit Alleges Tree Trimmer Branched Out Into Internet
Stock Fraud, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2000, at C15; see also Internet Sweep Media Packet, su-
pra note 253; Internet Fraud Crackdown, supra note 253 (both citing examples of SEC en-
forcement actions for fraudulent conduct in Internet chat rooms).
25
6 See Emshwiller, supra note 255; Teenage Trader Runs Afoul of the SEC as A Stock
Touting Draws Charges of Fraud, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2000, at CI (describing SEC en-
forcement action against fifteen-year-old for manipulating securities using Internet message
boards); Michael Schroeder, Georgetown Students Draw Web Investors-And an SEC Bust,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2000, at Al (describing SEC enforcement action against three George-
town University law students for manipulating securities using the message boards of Ya-
hoo! Inc. and Raging Bull).
257 CODE, supra note 154, at 84, 108.
25
8 See Coffee, supra note 68, at 1228-29.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 21:131 (2000)
not target or send e-mail to the United States. However, the Internet makes
this information available to those in the United States who want it. Fur-
ther, let us assume that this exchange becomes very popular due to its low
costs and fast execution, and as a result, U.S. investors gravitate to it. The
Professor queries, "what can the SEC do?"259
The answer to Professor Coffee is that the SEC will be able to check
whether the foreign market maker has a restrictive legend on its Web site.
Without the assistance of the regulator where the market maker is physi-
cally located, however, it will be nearly impossible to establish whether the
operator was actually taking steps necessary to prevent U.S. persons from
using the foreign system. Although the Commission can theoretically ob-
tain jurisdiction over a foreign-based cyberfraudster using the Schoenbaum
test, 6 the Commission may have the practical difficulty of effectuating any
enforcement action if the defendants are located in a jurisdiction without an
effective Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty or MOU with the United States.
Thus described, the IGSM proposal looks at securities activity over the
Internet in a more prospective manner than the Targeting Approach by ad-
vocating that market architecture be utilized to create a global market that
can be regulated by the SEC.
4. Resolution of Ongoing Issues Concerning the NMS
In Section lI(A)(6), this essay set forth the ongoing issues that have be-
set the NMS: consolidation-fragmentation of order flow, POF, and trans-
parency. The essay further revealed that these issues were exacerbated
when order flow is directed to a foreign market and not reported on the
NMS. Simply stated, the IGSM resolves these issues because the system
2s9 Id. at 1229. Such an exchange is no longer hypothetical. Small Xchange.com, an
Interet-based exchange registered in the British Virgin Islands, was recently launched. See
Odd Couple's Internet Stock Exchange Frustrates Italian Regulators Who Want to Clip It,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2000, at Cl. Small Xchange.com is in its "test phase." See id. The
exchange's Web site identifies eight listed companies. See id.
260 See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968). The court in Schoen-
baum set forth the "effects test." Pursuant to the effects test, a district court has subject
matter jurisdiction over a violation of the Exchange Act, "although the transactions which
are alleged to violate the Act take place outside the United States, at least when the transac-
tions involve a stock registered and listed on a national securities exchange, and are detri-
mental to the interests of American investors." Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 208.
A multi-national firm with offices in the United States may experience difficulties in re-
sponding to domestic investigative subpoena. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, U.S. v.
Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817 (11 Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985). In
that case, the Eleventh Circuit upheld civil contempt sanctions against Bank of Nova Scotia
for failure to make prompt subpoena production. The Bank argued that the delay was due to
the location of responsive documents in the Bahamas and Cayman Islands, and that produc-
tion would have violated the secrecy laws of those jurisdictions. The court rejected this ar-
gument, holding that the Bank had chosen to establish business in two jurisdictions with
inconsistent laws and was in a position to choose how to meet its legal obligations.
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design permits IGSM-listed securities to be traded only in a single market.
Therefore, trading would be completely consolidated, and there would be
no opportunity for payment of order flow. Similarly, because all orders
would be placed in time/price priority in a centralized book, the IGSM
would provide investors with a completely transparent market. Moreover,
unlike the NMS, which consolidates trading information, the IGSM would
consolidate execution, thereby preventing trade-through. Furthermore, the
IGSM would accomplish these goals without having to utilize the fine dis-
tinctions between broker-dealers, ATSs, SIPs, and exchanges that are util-
ized in the SEC's current approach. Such fine distinctions are difficult for
market participants to implement on a domestic basis and possibly unen-
forceable outside the United States. Finally, the IGSM could be designed to
permit completely disintermediated trading,261 one of the frequently over-
looked objectives of the NMS.
D. Possible Objections
1. Systems Failure
The Pavlovian response to this proposal is that the Internet is too un-
safe a medium of communication for the creation of a stock exchange. Af-
ter all, those who object can point to instances in which Internet systems
were subject to system breakdowns and intrusions by hackers. 262 This ob-
jection is well taken. For example, on February 9, 2000, hackers temporar-
ily seized the Web sites of Charles Schwab and E*Group (the largest and
second largest on-line brokers in the United States).263 For reasons
prompted by these occurrences, this essay proposes that the Commission
not grant registration to an Intemet-based stock exchange without consid-
ering the safety and soundness of the exchange's systems architecture to en-
sure investor protection and access, and market stability. In this regard, the
substantial volume of order flow to on-line brokers over the Internet and the
number of European bourses with remote cross-border trading set forth in
Section II establishes the technical feasibility of the IGSM. Finally, it is
noteworthy that even at the time of the Market 2000 Report, the existing
technology supported a Single Market Approach in the United States.
261 See Exchange Act § I 1A(a)(1)(C)(v); 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(1)(C)(v) (1994).
262 See, e.g., Julia Flynn, et al., Computer Snag Halts London Market for 8 Hours, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 6, 2000, at C14; Kara Scannell, NASDAQ's Delays During Record Trading Day
Raises Concerns of Computer Systems' Capability, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2000, at C9; Suss-
man, supra note 253, at 453-57 (setting forth examples of hacker intrusions); The Internet
Under Siege: Stalking The Hackers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2000 at B1; see generally On-line
Investing: Growing Pains, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1999 at R (compiling articles).263 See Rebecca Buckman, Cyberassaults Raise Jitters for Investors, WALL ST. J., Feb.
10, 2000, at Cl.
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2. Portable Reciprocity Approach
One may object that the functions of the IGSM may be better carried
out by sovereigns engaging in Portable Reciprocity. The Portable Reci-
procity approach also utilizes the theory of regulatory competition.264 This
theory is based on the idea of reciprocity, where one country acknowledges
the laws of another country. In the field of international securities offer-
ings, reciprocity means that a foreign company could issue securities in a
host country pursuant to the home country's disclosure rules. Portable
Reciprocity "goes one step further 2 65 by permitting issuers to select the law
of any country participating in the reciprocity agreement, regardless of the
location of issuer or the securities transaction. Accordingly, "[a] Japanese
company, for example, could choose German law to cover its securities of-
fering with the United States and all other participating jurisdictions. 266
Although the Portable Reciprocity approach has applicability to the
transnational trading securities on the Internet,267 this innovative proposal
suffers from two practical problems. Primarily, the issuers would have to
be accepted for listing by an exchange. It is unclear whether U.S. ex-
changes would accept for listing issuers from reciprocating countries. In
this regard, the authors note that exchanges do not compete across national
borders due to the existence of a dominant exchange in each country. 268 As
the data set forth herein2 69 establishes, this observation is not correct as an
empirical matter. The existence of POF establishes that exchanges compete
fiercely for order flow in domestic markets. The consolidation of ex-
changes in European markets supports the competitive nature of those mar-
kets. Secondly, serious confusion would result if issuers on a U.S.
exchange used differing disclosure and listing standards, rather than the
single listing requirements and disclosure standards of their home country.
The IGSM proposal promotes limited regulatory competition, but does not
go as far as the proposal for Portable Reciprocity, which creates too many
independent variables concerning any given issuer for investors to conduct
workable comparison of issuers using techniques of fundamental analysis.
3. Global Coordinator
One may object that the self-regulatory functions of an IGSM under
the auspices of the SEC would be better carried out by the regulatory
264 See generally Choi & Guzman, supra note 196.
265 Id. at 907.
26 Id. at 908.
267 See id. at 915.
268 See id. at 946.
269 See supra notes 112-113, 129-133 and accompanying text.
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"Global Coordinator" described supra.270 This proposal also suffers from
two practical difficulties. Primarily, as the commentator advocating the
Global Coordinator conceded, no such organization exists to fill the role of
the Global Coordinator.271 IOSCO, "the leading candidate" to fill this role,
does not possess any authority over member jurisdictions, as does an or-
ganization like the WTO.272 Moreover, IOSCO is in no position to develop
the institutional capability to act as Global Coordinator in any foreseeable
future, as the General Secretariat of IOSCO is staffed by only six people.273
Secondly, even if IOSCO were to develop the institutional capability to be-
come a Global Coordinator, serious efficiency concerns arise about the
creation of a superarching bureaucracy to regulate the existing bureaucra-
cies that take the form of the national securities regulatory bodies.
4. Trading in the NASDAQ Ten Issues is De Minimus
A fair criticism that can be leveled at this essay is that regardless of the
US$ 3.4 trillion in market capitalization of the NASDAQ Ten, the trading
volumes of these issuers on the EASDAQ are so small as to be de minimus.
On March 22, 2000, for example, the daily volume for Microsoft Corp. on
the NASDAQ was 31.8 million shares, versus 554 on the EASDAQ. 74
From this, one can conclude that the lack of reporting of the EASDAQ
trades to the NMS is inconsequential. In response to this objection, Section
II(B) supra, revealed the proliferation of ATSs, from transacting 13% to
20% of trading volume in NASDAQ-listed issuers in a period of four years.
This development indicates how quickly markets can proliferate in the pres-
ent high technology and globalized market environment. Moreover, the ac-
tivity in the "fax market," set forth in Section II(C) supra, indicates
substantial volumes (7 million shares per day in 1994), which provides
sound justification for policy reform.
270 See supra notes 225-227 and accompanying text. For the proposal that an SRO should
be established for Interet-based exchanges, see Daniel M. Gallagher, Move Over Ticker-
tape, Here Comes the Cyber-Exchange: The Rise of Internet-Based Securities Trading Sys-
tems, 47 CATH. U. L. REv. 1009 (1998).
271 See Geiger, supra note 225, at 1800-01.
272 See id. at 1801.
273 See IOSCO 1998 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10.
274 Compare http://finance.yahoo.com/qs=MSFT (last visited Mar. 22, 2000) with http:/l
www.easdaq.com (last visited Mar. 22, 2000). This Internet search revealed similar dispari-
ties in the volumes of NASDAQ Ten issues traded on the EASDAQ compared to the
NASDAQ. While each of the NASDAQ Ten has an average daily volume in the millions of
shares on the NASDAQ, the EASDAQ transacts volumes in these issuers in the thousands of
shares.
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5. Institutional Capacity of the SEC
This essay also is subject to the criticism that in response to a compli-
cated problem that incorporates law, technology and economics; it proposes
the architecture of the IGSM in very general form. One can argue that the
devil is in the details of implementing such a proposal. Furthermore, even if
a consortium of market participants could create a detailed implementation
plan for an IGSM, the SEC's lack of institutional capacity and limited expe-
rience "to regulate by code" described supra2 75 would prevent it from
granting registration to an IGSM. In answer to this criticism, it is important
to note that the SEC has dramatically increased its efforts in regulating the
Intemet. In July 1998, the Commission created the "Cyberforce" within the
Division of Enforcement to combat Internet based securities fraud.276
Within three months, the Cyberforce had charged 44 stock promoters with
using the Internet to engage in securities fraud. Within one year, the Cyber-
force had instituted over 100 civil actions regarding Internet securities
fraud. Moreover, Section II(C)(2)(e) supra indicates that the Commission
is increasingly setting general standards for the systems of participants.
This leads one to expect that the Commission is up to the task of developing
the personnel resources to address applications for registration by IGSMs.
6. Inability of Issuers to Influence Consolidation of Order Flow
A frequent criticism of this essay is that despite the systems architec-
ture of the IGSM, shares of IGSM-listed issuers will be traded eventually
on various markets, just as shares of the same issuer are traded on the dif-
ferent market centers within the NMS. Thus, the criticism argues that the
beneficial efficiency effects of the global consolidation of order flow will
eventually be diminished. This criticism speaks more to the way we think
about corporate law and the existing trading environment, than the capa-
bilities of an IGSM. We generally view the shares of listed companies as
being freely transferable. However, it has been long established that
"[r]easonable restrictions on share transfers may be imposed, thereby in-
jecting into the corporation the partnership principle of delectus perso-
nae." 77 Share transfer restrictions are generally used to keep a corporation
closely held," but they are also adopted by publicly-held issuers. Such
share transfer restrictions are generally utilized in the form of restricted
shares for management and employee compensation plans. The general
rule concerning a share transfer restriction is that it must be for a lawful
275 See supra text accompanying notes 154-168.
276 See generally Hunt, supra note 146; see also SEC Acts With Cyberspeed to Halt Sus-
pect Trades, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7,2000, at Cl.277 Harry G. Henn & John A. Alexander, Tan LAw OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BusiNEss ENTERPRISES 131 (3d ed. 1983) [hereinafter THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS]. Delec-
tuspersonae means "choice of the person." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 438 (7th ed. 1999).27
1 See TrH LAW OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 277, at § 281.
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purpose279 and must not constitute an unreasonable restraint on aliena-
tion.280 Due to the broad investor access provided by an IGSM, a share re-
striction that limits transferability (other than, for example, gifts or block
trades) to transactions made on the IGSM appears to meet these require-
ments. Indeed, the argument could be made that such a transfer restriction
would promote efficient alienation of IGSM-listed securities due to the con-
solidation of order flow. In non-U.S. jurisdictions, such a transfer restric-
tion in a corporate charter may be problematic.281 This difficulty, however,
could be overcome by means of a domestic re-incorporation.
The criticism that an IGSM will not prevent fragmentation of order
flow among various markets reveals our preconceptions about federal secu-
rities regulation. We are accustomed to thinking of shares of public issuers
as being freely alienable, but for shares issued as part of a compensation
package. However, with regards to unlisted trading privileges, Section
12(f) of the Exchange Act addresses the extension of unlisted trading privi-
leges by exchanges and national associations, but does not address the ac-
tions of issuers. 2 Moreover, Section 12(f) gives the Commission flexible
regulatory authority over the administration of unlisted trading privileges.
For example, from the establishment of the NMS until 1987, the Commis-
sion's policy was that Tier I of the NMS, which included most active OTC
issues, was mandatory; however, less active Tier II securities required ap-
plication by the issuer to be included in the NMS.283 Since 1987, the Two
Tier system ceased to operate at the NASD's initiative,284 and the prevailing
policy of Congress, 285 the Commission and exchanges has been to deem is-
279 See, e.g., Greene v. E.H. Rollins & Sons, 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A.2d 249 (Ch. 1938). See
generally THE LAW OF COPORAWONS, supra note 277, at 758.
280 See generally TBE LAW OF CORPORATiONS, supra note 277, at 758.
281 For example, Swiss corporate law utilizes the concept of qualified registered shares
("Vinkulierte Namenaktien"). For these shares, company charters may provide that the
board of directors can refuse to consent to the transfer of the shares (in case of refusal, all
financial rights are transferred and the voting rights are suspended). The permissible reasons
for refusal are different for corporations traded on stock exchanges and private corporations.
While the board of the former company may practically only block the transfer when a
shareholder acquires more shares than a set percentage limit, the latter may have reasons to
refuse that relate to the company's purpose or economic independence of the enterprise. See
Article 685d Swiss Code of Obligations. Therefore, under Swiss Law it is not possible for a
company charter to require that the shares be traded on a particular stock exchange.
282 Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(f). See generally Amihud & Mendelson, supra note
96, at 1411-1425 (analysis of federal securities law's application to unlisted trading privi-
leges).
283 See Designation of National Market System Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
17549, 22 SEC Docket 22, 25 (Feb. 17, 1981).2
14 See Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Securities Clearing Corporation; Order
Granting Approval to a Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 34-24635, 38
SEC Docket 152 (Apr. 17, 1987).285 See Unlisted Trading Privileges Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-389 (1994) (eliminating
requirement of Commission approval for grant of unlisted trading privileges).
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suer consent unnecessary to the extension of unlisted trading privileges on
multiple markets. It is noteworthy, however, that the Exchange Act permits
the Commission by rule or regulation to exempt unlisted trading of an issue
when "consistent with the maintenance of fair and orderly markets, the
protection of investors and the public interest, and otherwise in furtherance
of the purposes of this title.
286
V. CONCLUSION
Dramatic changes in global markets and technology have far outpaced
the regulation of market structure due to the Commission's dependency on
incremental modification to the NMS to accommodate changing conditions.
With respect to the regulation of global securities market structure and the
Internet, this essay has recommended that the Commission should recon-
ceptualize its approach from the current focus on territoriality that has pro-
duced the Targeting Approach, to a focus on systems architecture. Such a
shift in focus would bring the Commission's regulation in line with the me-
dium that it is attempting to regulate, one comprised of computer code and
structured to transcend geopolitical borders. As Table 8 illustrates, the ex-
isting regulatory approach to global securities markets has created a system
of inconsistent extraterritorial jurisdiction that has become more expansive
and uncertain due to the Targeting Approach being applied to securities ac-
tivity over the Internet.
This essay argues that it is optimal for industry participants to create a
global exchange with an architecture that will satisfy the regulatory con-
cerns of the SEC, and it is an invitation for them to do so. Indeed, imple-
mentation of this proposal would vastly improve the transparency, liquidity,
surveillance, and efficiency of the current trading platforms in the United
States that utilize home country disclosure through the Pink Sheets. Cer-
tainly, the rewards of such an accomplishment would be great in light of the
large global market that such an exchange could service due to the low
transactional costs that the Internet provides to investors regardless of their
location. Therefore, the essay argues that we need to reconceptualize the
role of home country disclosure in the U.S. market structure. After all, sub-
stantial foreign issuers like Nestle and Deutsche Bank were once traded on
the Pink Sheets.287 Thus, a market for issuers using home country disclo-
sure need not be for illiquid or non-transparent issues.
As can be expected, the process of modifying the regulation of market
structure in the United States spurs much debate, as different groups of
market participants seek competitive advantage.288 Unfortunately, the de-
286 Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(f)(1)(E)(i) (2000).
287 See Geiger, supra note 247, at 263 n.92.
288 See Randall Smith & Greg Ip, Exchanges, Firms Wrestle Over Structure, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 1, 2000, at C1 (describing testimony before the Senate Banking Committee in which
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bate has also fostered nationalistic concerns "about 'keeping New York and
America the center of global capital markets' in the face of overseas com-
petition. 2 89 Due to the expanse of global markets, a code-oriented regula-
tory system like an IGSM registration would further the efficiency and
extend the borders of the domestic securities market. In contrast, we know
that extending the NMS to foreign market linkages and application of the
Targeting Approach to Internet securities transactions are ultimately un-
workable solutions. However, the Commission's most recent Concept Re-
lease on fragmentation did not address the issue of global fragmentation.290
It is high time for market participants to provide input on their ability to
create a technologically cognizant, and therefore visionary, solution to the
problem of global market fragmentation due to the Internet.
If the market participants succeed in creating an IGSM, its efficiency
will draw issuers seeking listings to reduce their cost of capital. Ironically,
the current debate on market structure is between domestic exchanges and
market participants, not the issuers. Perhaps it is also time for issuers to re-
alize their stake in an efficient global market, rather than having their shares
traded in whatever venue market participants desire.
"the heads of four major U.S. securities firms pressed strongly for their vision of a 'central-
ized' market structure" facing "objections from the heads of the N.Y.S.E., the NASDAQ"
and a major discount brokerage firm.); see also Greg Ip et al., Market-Structure Debate Em-
broils Street, WALL ST. ., Feb. 22,2000, at C19.
289 Smith & Ip, supra note 288, at C1 (quoting Senator Charles Schumer (D., N.Y)).
2 See Fragmentation Release, supra note 134.
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